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Summary.  
The “Final Agreement to end the armed conflict and build a stable and lasting peace” signed on 
24 November 2016 by the Colombian Government and FARC-EP has been presented as being 
innovative with respect to other peace agreements. However the first evaluations on 
implementation point at delays and shortcomings, specifically regarding those measures involving 
the rural dimension of the agreement (Comprehensive Rural Reform including access to land, 
socio-economic rehabilitation of former combattants eradication of illicit crops). These are 
precisely the measures, programmes and plans that intended attacking the roots of armed conflict 
and thus laying the basis for a lasting peace (as different from those sections of the final agreement 
relating to laying down arms and instauring a special justice system). The authors acknowledge 
this quest for innovation, but argue that the low rate of implementation of the rural dimension of 
the agreement observed in two departments (Caquetá and Putumayo) should be sought, firstly, in 
the quality of the formulation of the text of the agreement itself and the process through which it 
was produced. A second explanation emerges from the analysis of the way in which the national 
government steadily added financial, institutional and organizational arrangements for 
implementation into the existing State apparatus, without questioning and rethinking its 
functioning thusfar. Finally the analysis of how the international “community" channeled and 
managed external resources in support of the implementation of the peace agreement, may 
contribute to a third explanation. The authors then suggest some alternative paths, including a 
focus on future managing of land issues in the two departments studied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               1	Although we are indebted for the comments received, this text remains under the sole responsibility of 
the authors and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of the institutions to whom they are affiliated. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The “Final Agreement to end the armed conflict and build a stable and lasting peace” signed on 
24 November 2016 by the Colombian Government and FARC-EP has been presented as being 
innovative with respect to other peace agreements.  The most innovative aspects that were 
highlighted were "the distinction between conflict termination (by the warring factions) and 
conflict transformation (by society at large)", "placing the victims at the centre of the talks", 
"addressing rural development, land reform and drugs trafficking", "the creation of a gender 
commission", and last but not least "preparing for implementation before completing the 
negotiations", (Herbolzheimer, 2016, p. 3-5). Likewise, a recurring reference to innovation appears 
in most policy and investment documents since the signing of the agreement (both at the level of 
government and the donors: innovative plans and laws, innovative ways of producing new laws 
(via a “fast track” law), innovative agencies, innovative funds, innovative approaches and projects, 
etc.).  We certainly acknowledge this quest and need for innovation. Based on our earlier or 
ongoing fieldwork in several conflict-ridden areas of Colombia, we also acknowledge how 
difficult it must have been for the representatives of Government and FARC to convene the peace 
process and guide it´s participants towards this agreement. 
  
Nevertheless, five thorough evaluations have shed their lights on the first months of the 
implementation of the final agreement (Kroc Institute, 2018; CINEP-CERAC, 2018, 2019; 
Controlaría General de la República, 2018; United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, July, 
September, December 2018; Crisis Group, 2018).  While these reports recognized the swift way 
FARC-EP ceased hostilities and layed down arms as well as the efforts undertaken by the 
Colombian Government to create the organisational and institutional frameworks for 
implementation (numerous decrees and policy documents), the reports also analyzed delays, 
shortcomings (“far from expected implementation”), the mis or underfinancing, the lack of 
military or political control on other armed groups redeploying in the spaces left by the FARC EP 
and the killings of social leaders and ex-combattants. Likewise the Crisis Group (2018) analyzed 
the policy tensions that have emerged following President Duque’s election, his views and first 
measures and how they may reshape the implementation of the Final Agreement during his 
presidential term 2018-2022. In addition to the four mentioned evaluation reports, a mention 
should be made of the diagnosis of the organizational and institutional arrangements for the 
implementation of the Final Agreement made in the document “Basis for the National 
Development Plan” (DNP, 2018, p. 648-649). Finally, three reports by researchers affiliated to the 
Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center (NOREF) (Herbolzheimer, 2016; Nylander, Sandberg 
and Tvedt, 2018) or to the International Peace Institute (Segura and Mechoulan, 2017) provided 
insights in the negotiation process itself. We wish to take stock of these contributions2.  
 
In order to facilitate their reading, we identified what we perceived as being the main elements of 
the value chain of the peace process and of the context in which it unfolds. We then summarized 
the focus of each of these evaluations in Table 1, “Main focus of the recent reviews of the peace 
process in Colombia (2016-2019)”. What we learned from this synthesis is that the attention of the 
reviewers has been concentrated on a limited range of the issues at stake (see table 1).
                                               
2 The tittle of Segura and Mechouan’s contribution (2017) causes surprise (… Colombia y las FARC…), 
as if FARC were not part of Colombia… This does not alter the quality of the text. 
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Table 1 Main focus of the recent reviews of the peace process in Colombia (2018) 
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Macro political, socio-economic and environmental policies, organization of the 
national finances, functioning of the State, all elements formally out of scope of the 
peace process but affecting its implementation  
        
Other actors and situations around the negotiation process (the evolutions in Venezuela 
-one of the two observer states-, the situations of other armed actors within Colombia, 
actors related to the ilicit drugs value chains, illegal mining, the situation of social 
leaders and ex-combattants, etc.) and their impacts on the implementation 
(x) X  X   X 
The negotiation process X       
The negotiation result (the text of the agreement)        
The translation of the final agreement into a  Framework Plan for Implementation of 
the Agreements (PMI) (the PMI was supposed to operationalize the final agreement) 
    X   
The financial arrangements for the implementation of the agreement (sources, pledged, 
made available and under control, disbursed) 
    X   
The institutional arrangements for implementation (decrees, laws, policies, plans), 
foreseen / formulated / approved 
 X X  X X X 
The organizational arrangements for implementation foreseen / designed / put in place 
/ functioning and impacts (reshuffling, new agencies, new funds etc.) 
 X X  X X X 
The activities on the ground (demobilization and reincorporation, special jurisdiction 
for peace, other projects, programmes, …), foreseen / carried out 
 X X X    
The results of activities, intended / delivered ; the impacts of results, intended versus 
observed 
 end of 
hostilities, 
laying down 
arms, justice 
     
The global impact of the implementation of the peace agreement        
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While it is too early to look at the impact of an agreement that has been recently signed, and that 
thererefore few attention has been given till now to the results of operations on the ground and 
their impacts (because so few operations have unfolded), we were nevertheless surprised by the 
fact that several themes remain non or under-analyzed: i) the macro political, financial, socio-
economic and environmental policies, and the organizational legacy of the State 3 ; ii) the 
negotiation process per se, and last but not least iii) the negotiation result (a review of the 
agreement itself).   
 
Although the reviews of implementation tend to converge on certain series of delays and 
shortcomings, they do not coincide on the implications of their findings. Is this slow start just the 
usual trend in worldwide peace implementation processes, with it´s lows and highs (Kroc Institute, 
2018, p. 60)? Should one then just be patient and persistent and continue implementation despite 
some disturbing findings? Is all what was agreed really that clearly and equally well defined, 
implementable and verifiable, in all chapters of the agreement (CGR, 2018)? Should one then also 
take for granted the efforts made under President Santos to create the financial, organizational and 
institutional frames for implementation4? Or should one question, not the peace intention it self, 
but the formulation of specific parts of the agreement and the way implementation was 
conceptualized, financed and managed? The authors would rather follow this last quest. 
In the frame of our contribution, the authors will look more specifically at the implementation of 
those aspects of the final agreement, that closely relate to the rural areas and land issues in rural 
areas, those are : i) Chapter 1 of the Final Agreement «Towards a new countryside : 
Comprehensive Rural reform » which was mainly inspired by the results of the Mission for the 
Transformation of Rural Colombia (also called Misión Rural) coordinated by José Antonio 
Ocampo (DNP, 2016)5 ; ii) Point 3.2.2 Economic and Social Reintegration in Chapter 3 “End of 
                                               
3 From the start, the issue of the nature of the Colombian economic and political model was declared out of 
the scope of the peace talks. This does not mean that these macro dimensions don’t potentially affect 
implementation. An illustration of this is the reference to underfinancing of the implementation of the final 
agreement, as claimed by the new team during the presidential transition.”Falta de Presupuesto Podría Dejar 
La Paz a Medio Camino - Proceso de Paz - Política - ELTIEMPO.COM.” Accessed September 24, 2018. 
https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/falta-de-presupuesto-podria-dejar-la-paz-a-medio-
camino-272022. Read also : “Decir que no hay plata para la paz, también es hacer trizas el acuerdo’: 
Mauricio Jaramillo | Colombia 2020.” Accessed October 8, 2018. 
https://colombia2020.elespectador.com/pais/decir-que-no-hay-plata-para-la-paz-tambien-es-hacer-trizas-
el-acuerdo-mauricio-jaramillo.  
4 « Colombia ha sentado las bases para una paz estable y duradera. Ahora es necesario consolidar la 
implementación de los procesos y programas de mediano y  largo plazo que se crearon con el Acuerdo para 
resolver las raíces del conflicto armado e impulsar una paz transformadora y de calidad en el país” (Kroc 
Institute, 2018, p. 23). 
5 See also CRDI, IDRC. José Antonio Ocampo - Rural Development in a Post-Conflict Colombia (2015). 
Accessed January 4, 2018, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvaAzhBo_4.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvaAzh-Bo_4. 
Rimisp, a thinktank initially financed by IFAD and initially based in Chile, played a key role in the rural 
mission (Julio Berdegué, founder of Rimisp, and presently Assistant Director-General and Regional 
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conflict”,  and iii) points 4.1.1 to 4.1.6 dedicated to the National Comprehensive Programme for 
the Substitution of Crops Used for Ilicit purposes (PNIS), in Chapter 4 “Solution to the illicit drugs 
problem”.  The authors have chosen these aspects not only because these have been their themes 
of research for years but also because of the fact that, according to Kristian Herbolzheimer, Chapter 
1 and 3 belong to the group of first three issues “that were agreed on relatively smoothly, with 
each taking some six months of negotiation” (Herbolsheimer, 2016, p. 3). 
Furthermore, the authors have chosen to look at the implementation from the perspectives of two 
departments -Caquetá and Putumayo-, selected because they were key areas of confrontation 
during the war, with frequent conflicts around coca growing and/or mining and oil extraction and 
their impact on land issues,and are still marked by the lack of economic and social infrastructure 
(civil presence of the State). If they were difficult theaters of war, they probably will be difficult 
theaters of the peace construction6. 
 
Research question. This text will try to answer the following question:  viewed from the two 
selected departments (Caquetá and Putumayo), what were the reasons for the “delays” and 
“problems” during the implementation of the rural dimension of the final agreement, and what are 
the specific effects on the land issues in the two departments considered? 
 
Approach. This contribution is part of an ongoing research within the research  network 
“Transitions in Latinamerica and the Caribbean”7. One of the core interests within this network is 
about distinguishing trajectories from “critical junctures” (Cappoccia & Kelemen, 2005, 2007).  In 
the case of Colombia, the project tries to appreciate the nature of the peace process, in terms of 
whether it is still a simple prolongation of the previous trajectory characterized by “a low-
governability system” (Matus, 1987; van Vliet 1997) or “a war system” (Richani, 2014)8, or 
                                               
Representative for Latin America and the Caribbean of the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), and 
Santiago Perry (associate researcher of Rimisp) were members of the Directive Council for the Rural 
Misión study. Maria Angela Penagos (presently Director for Rimisp Colombia) was member of the 
Technical Secretariat for the study (in her previous role as Director, Sustainable Rural Development, 
National Planning Department). 
6 El gran reto de la implementación del acuerdo de paz está en las zonas que dejaron las Farc | Colombia 
2020.” Accessed January 9, 2018. https://colombia2020.elespectador.com/pais/el-gran-reto-de-la-
implementacion-del-acuerdo-de-paz-esta-en-las-zonas-que-dejaron-las-farc. “En San Vicente se fueron 
las Farc pero las ‘vacunas’ se multiplicaron.” La Silla Vacía. Accessed January 9, 2018. 
http://lasillavacia.com/historia/en-san-vicente-se-fueron-las-farc-pero-las-vacunas-se-multiplicaron-
61845. 
7 Created in Villa de Leyva (Colombia) in september 2017, the Network Transitions in LAC  is presently 
composed of researchers and resource persons from Colombia, Haiti, the USA and Europe.The network, 
aims at improving our understanding of the attempts of transition from unequal, often violent rentier- to 
redistributive, productive- economies in Latin America and the Caribbean region.  
8 This is the position persistently defended by Professor Nazih Richani, who tweeted on 13 January 2019 
: “In a nutshell the #FARC’s accord with the#Colombian state is at best an experience with very mixed 
results if not a total failure, in finding solutions to the rural crisis, income inequalities, and the rentier 
model ». See also General Ruíz, “El Proceso de Paz fue un Fracaso: General Ruíz,” December 11, 2018. 
http://www.wradio.com.co/noticias/actualidad/el-proceso-de-paz-fue-un-fracaso-general-
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whether the peace process with FARC EP might indeed have created a situation which might be 
charaterized as a true “critical juncture”, that is, a relatively short period during which actors are 
confronted with sudden changes in their environment or their resource base, and seize an 
opportunity to experiment and try out the construction of a new trajectory (without the guarantee 
that a new trajectory will indeed been engaged in)9. In the view of the members of the network, 
although the post agreement process, as “a critical juncture”, has been submitted to multiple 
pressures, so heavily, that it might be reaching it´s limits10, it is still there11.  
 
This text will focus on this agreement and its implementation in Colombia.  The scope of this text 
is limited : the text will not compare the peace process in Colombia with similar processes and 
agreements elsewhere in the world. This contribution will focus on the Final Agreement in 
Colombia and the start of its implementation. The authors intend to answer the question by firstly 
summarizing the main caracteristics of implementation in the two departments considered, in terms 
of the rural dimension of the agreement (RRI, economic and social reintegration of former 
combattants, eradication of illicit drugs).  In a second section, based on information available, the 
authors will identify some features of the negotiation process and analyze how these might have 
influenced the result (the agreement itself). In a third section, based on a review of the literature 
and our field knowledge,  the authors will try to add to the available analysis of the financial, 
institutional and organizational arrangements for implementation introduced during the 
presidential term of President Santos, and how they merged with the already functioning State. In 
a fourth section, we will review the specific role assigned by government to the international 
community and how the implementation linked with the capacities of the Colombian actors and 
agencies. Finally we will wrap up our analysis and present our conclusions and recommendations.  
                                               
ruiz/20181211/nota/3836390.aspx.While the statistics concerning the destiny of the outcomes of peace 
processes worldwide do favor a sound level of escepticism, what about the possiblity that this process 
belongs to the exceptions and produces a favorable result? Therefore our insistance on analyzing the 
critical juncture and thus trying to contribute to maintain the space it still provides. 
9 The notion of critical juncture will be utilised to describe an observable change in the internal resource 
base and/or in the environment of an organisation, which during a limited period substantially broadens 
the range of options available to the organisation and increases the potential reach of the decisions 
eventually taken (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2005, 2007). 10 	The cumulative impacts of the continuing killings of social leaders, precandidates and former 
combattants, the still pending decision of the Special Justice Juridicion (JEP) regarding the fate of Jesús 
Santrich -one of the members of the Farc delegation during the negotiations in la Havana-, the recent 
provocations around the JEP and the recent presidential decision to return the question of the approval 
of its procedures to Congress, are  adding up.  11	Experienced participants in a recent training in Putumayo, when asked, mentioned the following visible 
effects of the signature of the peace agreeement : “Therethere is still violence, but there are lots of 
meetings we could have never organized or attended before the signature- and likewise there are many 
places we could have never visited before”.” (Pensamiento estratégico y cadenas de valor, a workshop 
organized by the Network Transitions, the Technological Institute of Putumayo, ICANH, CERSUR and 
CIRAD, Mocoa, February 2019). 
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2. Results and analysis 
2.1 Main characteristics of the implementation of the rural dimension of the final 
agreement in Caquetá and Putumayo 
 
While post-signature related vehicles were criss-crossing the departments, the first characteristic 
of the implementation of the rural dimension of the peace agreement in the two departments has 
been the lack of knowledge, at the departmental level, of what would be precisely implemented by 
the public and private sectors in Caquetá and Putumayo. Would agencies been set up or deployed 
in the department? Would money pour in? Who would do what, were? Or would it only be plans? 
During the  two first years, several activities although limited in scope, were indeed seen on the 
ground regarding the rural dimension of the agreement. They included a) the deployment of the 
National Comprehensive Programme for the Substitution of Crops Used for Ilicit purposes (PNIS), 
with voluntary substitution agreements being promoted (with the cooperation of ex-combattants 
and assistance from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in diverse areas of 
the Departments; b) when land was available, several projects mainly managed by donors, financed 
productive activities on or around the Territorial Spaces for Formation and Reintegration (the 
ETCR are the spaces were former combattants have been gathered after the signature of the final 
agreement and the laying down of arms); and c) elaboration of plans. Local authorities were not 
always fully aware of what was going on in their municipalities or departments despite of the fact 
that one of the main activity perceived on the ground was territorial planning. And plans there 
were. 
 
In order to promote the agriculture dimension of the final agreement, the first step was the 
elaboration and implementation of the so-called “Development Programs with a  Territorial 
Approach (PDET)” in municipalities that answered the following criteria: lack of institutionality, 
high levels of poverty, presence of crops for ilicit use and lasting effects of armed conflict. These 
local PEDT would then be merged into larger regional plans, the Ten Year Regional 
Transformation Action Plans (PATR). Thus, after multiple dialogues at sub-municipal, municipal, 
inter-municipal and departmental levels, two Ten Year PATR relating to Caquetá and Putumayo 
have been approved : the first for the sub-region Putumayo that covers the Municipalities of 
Leguizamo, Mocoa, Orito, Puerto Asis, Puerto Caicedo, Puerto Guzman, San Miguel, Valle del 
Guamuéz and Villagarzón (and was launched the 25th of September 2018); the second PATR for 
the sub-region Caguán river basin and the Andean foothills in Caquetá was launched on January 
31, 2019.  
 
2.1.1 PDET and PATR : dealing with the legacies of previous local planning 
processes… 
The “participatory” programming processes had to overcome several challenges. The first one was 
that this was not the first time that the region was involved in participatory initiatives (Fals Borda, 
1987). Policies aiming at creating the conditions for development in areas affected by the internal 
armed conflict have been deployed in Colombia since 1958. Thus the departments of Putumayo 
and Caquetá have been prioritized in the sixties by the programme aiming at the creation of the 
Communal Action Boards (Juntas de Action Communal), then the colonization projects pioneered 
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by INCORA in Caquetá (and financed by the World Bank) in the late sixties and early seventies, 
then the National Rehabilitation Plan PNR (between 1984 and 1990)12 and the National Alternative 
Development Plan13 PLANTE, (between 1995 and 2004). The National Rehabilitation Plan PNR, 
was a part of the "Agreements of the Uribe", between the FARC and the government of Belisario 
Betancur, in the frame of a possible peace agreement. The focus of PNR was thus the creation of 
legitimacy. Some of these programmes produced results on the ground and are nowadays still 
gladly remembered (Incora, PNR). Instead, the Territorial Consolidation Programme 14 
implemented between 2004 and 2015 inaugured a long period during which the focus was on 
coercition. 
 
The Territorial Consolidation Program (PCT) was initially created under the presidency of Álvaro 
Uribe in 2004, within his overall counterinsurgence policy (Ramírez, 2019). Its aim was to promote 
civil projects and conditions for economic and social development, once the armed forces had 
completed military operations in a given area15. In 2011, under the government of Juan Manuel 
Santos, the Program is transformed in a National Policy for Territorial Consolidation and 
Reconstruction, to be implemented by the Special Administrative Unit for Territorial 
Consolidation (Unidad Administrativa Especial para la Consolidación Territorial, UAECT). The 
policy was still aimed at “cleaning the zones from the presence of illegal armed groups, interrupt 
their support networks and eradicate coca”16. This focus was modified in 2015, as the peace talks 
in La Havana were delivering some signs of progress : the UAECT was reorganized and its 
functions were redistributed to three organisms. Some functions remained with the Administrative 
Department for Social Prosperity (DAPS). A number of functions and civil servants belonging to 
the territorial consolidation programme were incorporated in respectively, the Agency for 
Territorial Renovation (created in 2015) and in the National Program for Ilicit Crops Substitution 
(PNIS). After the signing of the final agreement, the expectation was that the PDET and the PNIS 
would have a larger coverage and impact compared to the previous plans, now that they would be 
supported by both the FARC and the Colombian State.  
 
However in Caquetá, the formulation of the “Development Programs with a Territorial Approach” 
(PDET) and the Action Plan for Regional Transformation (PATR) was led by a group of 
functionaries of the Agency for the Renewal of the Territory (ART) that had been previously 
                                               
12The National Rehabilitation Plan (PNR) was implemented in 346 municipalities of the departments of 
Caquetá, Huila, Putumayo, Chocó, Meta, Guaviare, Nariño, Cauca, Tolima, Cundinamarca, Risaralda, 
Caldas, Vichada, Arauca, Boyacá, Antioquia, Santander, Norte de Santander, Bolívar , Sucre, Córdoba, 
Cesar (Montenegro N.,  1990).  
13 This policy was developed in the departments of Guaviare, Putumayo, Huila, Tolima, Caquetá, Bolívar, 
Meta, Antioquia and Nariño. 14	The regions prioritized by the Territorial Consolidation Program (PCT) were: Montes de María (Bolivar 
and Sucre), Catatumbo (Norte de Santander), Arauca, Nudo de Paramillo (Antioquia and Magdalena), 
Cordillera Central (Tolima, Huila, Cauca and Valle del cauca), Cagúan (Caquetá) and Macarena (Meta). 15 	In Caquetá, the Plan for Territorial Consolidation priorized the municipalities of San Vicente del 
Cuagúan, La Montañita and Cartagena del Chaira. 	16 	https://dialogo-americas.com/es/articles/consolidacion-territorial-en-colombia-el-derecho-territorio-
y-un-territorio-con-derechos	
	 10	
working with the “Territorial Consolidation Programme” and its approach (Mesa Nacional de 
seguimiento de los PDET, 2018). Notwithstanding the fact that the ART was allowed to finance 
the construction of small community infrastructure in order to facilitate the interaction with local 
constituencies17, the first attempts to generate "participatory" programming processes were testing. 
It took months to create a climate of trust, the more because other omissions or errors occurred 
throughout the implementation of the planning process.  
 
The methodology for the elaboration of the PDETs was not previously consulted with the 
Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Verifying of the Implementation of the Final 
Agreement (CSIVI) (Mesa Nacional de Seguimiento a los PDET, 2018). The choosen approach 
did neither take stock of earlier local management capacity building initiatives (Montenegro, 1990; 
van Vliet, 1990). In addition, instead of relying on the "neighborhood areas" (núcleos veredales), 
a space unit created decades ago by the Communal Action Boards (Juntas de Acción Communal), 
and which do actually function as socially constructed and apprehended "spaces", other spatial 
configurations were imposed during the planning process in some municipalities18. This caused 
friction with the submunicipal territorial representatives, including the representatives of the party 
FARC that attended the “dialogues around the Development Programs with a Territorial 
Approach” (PDET´s)19. Certain themes discussed during the programming exercises were not 
retaken in the documents finalized by the ART (for example conflictual situations involving large 
private sector projects including extractives). The “participative” character of the exercices was 
questioned by participants in Caqueta and Putumayo (Mesa Nacional de Seguimiento a los PDET, 
2018). The methodology foresaw a preformatted menu of “pillars” or potential components of the 
local development plan.  
 
Very soon and despite their name, the approach sustaining the elaboration of the PDETs became 
more sectoral than territorial and the resulting programmes appeared more as induced wishlists 
than actions selected and ordered with a strategic insight. In practice, as has been verified on the 
ground by one of the authors of this text, the discussions were organized along each of the pillars 
suggested in the proforma plans, without taking into account the territorial specificities. In each of 
the PDET, roads were thus asked for, whatever the conditions of the existing infrastructure and 
whatever the critical distance to the local and intermediary markets. Moreover, since the signing 
of the Final Agreement, contradictory signals have been  issued  by the successive national 
governments about what to do with the results of these local planning processes.  
 
Thus, the approved PATRs, conceived for a deceny, might face a difficult time in getting beyond 
their first year. Indeed, what emerges is that despite the many signatures, these 10 year planning 
exercises do not imply any formal financial engagement (neither from the private sector, neither 
                                               
17 These small infrastructure works were carried out in the municipalities of Belén de los Andaquies, San 
Vicente del Cagúan, La Montañita, El Paujil and Cartagena del Chaira. 18	Interview with a member of the Departmental Association of Peasant and Environmental Organizations 
of Caqueta (COORDESAC). 	19 	Los Planes de Desarrollo Territorial como un instrumento de construcción de paz , 
http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/plan-desarrollo-
territorial/documentos/pdt-instrumento-construccion-paz.pdf 
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from municipal or departmental governments). Departmental and municipal authorities are invited 
to include the actions foreseen in their respective development programmes, but this is not binding. 
On the national level, there is no hard obligation other than “to promote the inclusion of this PATR 
into the National Development Plan”. Consequently, the authors reviewed the PATR for Caquetá, 
the Main Document of the National Development Plan 2018-2022 and the document “Bases for a 
National Development Plan20” (its Annex), both documents being discussed in congress at the 
moment of writing this text.  
 
The existence of the PATR is acknowledged in the PND and its annex, but none of these two 
documents refer specifically to the already elaborated PATR, the lengthy preparation processes, 
the meetings with so many people, the expectations they have rised and the concrete way in which 
these will be met and financed. Instead, DNP proudly insists on it´s own participatory process for 
the elaboration of it´s “New Regional Pacts” 21 . However, the proposed “Regional Pact for 
Amazonia” (which includes the department of Caquetá and Putumayo), does not even mention the 
issue of access to land, while this was the number one objective identified in the PATR for these 
departments22. Furthermore,  during the preparation of several PDETs (for example in El Doncello 
and El Paujil in Caquetá), participants to the planning dialogues refused their free, prior and 
informed consent (FIPC) to the realization of extractive activities in their territories 23 . 
Notwithstanding, the promotion of extractives appears as a priority investment in the “Regional 
Pact for Amazonia”. In recent meetings in Caquetá, functionaries of the national level have 
reiterated that the new government feels obliged to the PDET (a proposal of the “Misión para la 
transformación del campo, DNP,  2016)”). They also explained that there would be no specific 
financing for the PDET´s (indeed, the National Development Plan 2018-2022 now proposed for 
congressional approval, does not mention a specific budget line for this purpose in the main text). 
                                               20	The elaboration of the document Bases para el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2018-2022 was coordinated 
by Juan Mauricio Rámirez, former deputy head of DNP and Principal Researcher at Rimisp (see also 
footnote 4). 
21 « Siete talleres regionales fueron elaborados con el apoyo de la Unión Europea, en el marco de un 
proyecto liderado por la GIZ con Econometría Consultores. Los aliados regionales que apoyaron los 
ejercicios fueron: en la Orinoquía Corporación Desarrollo para la Paz del Piedemonte Oriental- Cordepaz; 
en el Pacífico la Fundación para el Desarrollo Integral del Pacífico- FDI; en los Santanderes el Centro 
Regional de Gestión para la Productividad e Innovación de Boyacá- CREPIB; en el Caribe la Fundación para 
el Desarrollo del Caribe- Fundesarrollo; en Antioquia la Fundación para el Progreso de Antioquia- 
Proantioquia; en el Eje Cafetero el Centro de Estudios Regionales Cafeteros y Empresariales- CRECE; y, en 
la Región Central la Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá y el Centro de Productividad del Tolima. Al ejercicio 
también contribuyeron las Comisiones Regionales de Competitividad, las Cámaras de Comercio y las 
Regiones Administrativas y de Planificación- RAP. El Taller de la Región Amazonia La Amazonia en el 
Plan Nacional de Desarrollo del presidente Duque fue liderado por la Oficinaoficina de Pazpaz de la 
Universidad de la Amazonia, con apoyo del DNP. El taller de san Andrés, Santa Catalina y Providencia se 
hizo en el marco de la Comisión de Fronteras con apoyo de Cancillería.” (DNP, 2018, p.872). 22	The following analysis helps to contextualize this : “El silencio de Duque frente a la política de tierras.” 
Cerosetenta, September 30, 2018. https://cerosetenta.uniandes.edu.co/el-silencio-de-duque-frente-a-la-
politica-de-tierras/. 23	Likewise, in the nearby department of Meta, several municipalites asked for due consultation before 
the delivery of exploration or exploitation permits by the Ministry of Mining and Energy.	
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Instead, the PDET´s will have to be financed through the resources allocated to territorial 
authorities (via the General Participations System) or via the General Royalty System, and thus 
imply the expansion of extractive activities (oil, mining and gas) that are precisely not desired in 
several municipalities…. This approach, which might be easily confused with a form of blackmail, 
most essentially contradicts the policies of the World Bank and the International Finance 
Corporation on stakeholder participation around extractive activites : the application of the 
principle of Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) does not allow governments or firms to 
afterwards retaliate against populations or territorial entities that said no, by withholding their 
access to public goods and services to which they are entitled as citizens24. Recent fieldwork in 
Putumayo and Caquetá confirms the lack of governemental capacity to adequately handle debates 
around extractive activities and to reach commonly agreed basic rules for the extractive game. 
These should answer the following essential questions : 1. Operate or not? 2. If operation is 
allowed, where can extractive activities take place? 3. Who may operate (what level of previous 
experience will be required?)? 4. How to operate (which standards and techniques, what levels of 
insurance in view of the anticipated risks, local content, local linkages in each site)? 5. How will 
extractive industries contribute to energy transition (in the extractive regions and nation wide)? 6. 
How to improve the repartition of benefits along the extractive value chains? 7. How to improve 
credible monitoring and enforcement?  
As may be observed elsewere, different ministries within government maintain numerous and 
opposing rules for the use of space on the same spaces resulting in overlapping and contradicting 
maps : the areas for oil and mining exploration and production, the preserved forests maps, the 
protected areas maps, the maps reflecting territorial areas for indigeneous and agro-colombian 
communities, the maps reflecting specific cultural heritage sites, etc.). Addressing this sole fact, 
could help avoid most of the environmental and social conflicts around extractives in Colombia. 
Meanwhile, participatory environmental zoning exercises, foreseen in the Final Agreement, have 
been implemented in the two departments25. In Caquetá, 9 of the 16 muncipalities participated in 
environmental zoning exercises. In the department of Putumayo the environmental zoning was 
carried out in 5 of the 9 PDET municipalities26. Although the scale at 1:100,000 used in some 
municipalities did not allow for detailed analysis,  for all municipalities the exercise constituted a 
useful input for the environmental reordering of the territories. In these processes, the previously 
                                               24 https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/938f1a0048855805beacfe6a6515bb18/IFC_StakeholderEngag
ement.pdf?MOD=AJPERES; see also : http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETENVIRONMENT/Resources/UpdatedStakeholderEngagementandGrievanceMechanisms.pdf	25	These environmental zoning processes were coordinated by the United Nations Development Program, 
the Study Center for Peace and Institute Sinchi. 
https://www.sinchi.org.co/files/PUBLICACIONES%20DIGITALES/Zonificaci%C3%B3n%20Ambiental%20y
%20Ordenamiento%20de%20la%20Reserva%20Forestal%20de%20la%20Amazonia/1.%20Sistemas%20
General%20Zonificacion/light1%20SG_2%20Documento%20S%C3%ADntesis%20Final%20Fase%20I%20y
%20II.compressed.pdf 26	In May 2018, the Ministry of the Environment informed that participatory environmental zoning had 
been developed in 139 of the 170 PDET municipalities. See: https://www.jep.gov.co/Sala-de-
Prensa/Documents/RENDICI%C3%93N%20DE%20CUENTAS%20MADS.pdf.  
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practised formal and informal regulations were taken into account and the capacity building 
obtained through broad participation and involvement of local stakeholders counted as much as 
the production of the technical documents27. 
2.1.2 The floating policies around illicit crops substitution 
A third characteristic of the first years of implementation were the contradictory policy signals 
around the issue of illicit crop substitution. The National Illicit Drug Substitution Program (PNIS) 
was one of the first deployed in the two departments (in fact it represented a continuation of the 
activities previously carried out under the UAECT). Under the program, in Caquetá 15 of the 16 
municipalities have signed substitution agreements for 21,981 families of coca growers and 
collectors. Five of these municipalities (Solano, Valparaíso, Solita, Milan and Albania) do not yet 
have registered families, since they have not yet carried out the coca growers censuses in these 
municipalities. As a consequence, in 2018 only 10,310 families were enrolled. While first 
agreements had already been made (starting in 2016), and while crops were already voluntarily 
eradicated in several of the most difficult areas, the fact is that by the end of the Santos presidency 
several payments to the participating actors in the substitution programme had not been honored 
by government. Things got worse during the installment of the new government, because of the 
confusing policy signals initially send. It appeared as if only forced substitution would be 
implemented and that previously made agreements on voluntary substitution would not hold. This 
generated confusion. Appeals to replant coca could be heard, specifically from the side of 
dissidents of Farc and other actors related to the illicit drug value chain. People that had eradicated 
coca and did not receive the promised compensation payment got more indebted than they already 
usually are, in several cases leading to abandonment or even the sale of the land they occupied.   
 
It took several weeks for Mr. Emilio Archila, the Presidential counselor for post-conflict, to 
confirm that the new government would respect the agreements made with actors participating in 
voluntary substitution and that forced eradication would only be applied when voluntary 
substitution would not work (as agreed in the final agreement). The proposed PND 2018-2022 
finally confirms this (DNP, 2018, p. 643). It remains to be seen when and if this signal will 
effectively reach the coca growers participating in the substitution programme. Indeed, coca-
growing families from the municipalities of Solano, Solita and Milan have mobilized in 2018 and 
San José del Fragua (in 2019) asking for their inclusion in the National Comprehensive Programme 
for the Substitution of Crops Used for Ilicit Purposes, PNIS. In reply, the recently elected 
government stated that it would not include more families in the substitution program despite 
collective agreements, since it does not have the resources to finance this policy28. Meanwhile, in 
                                               27	Additionnally, Institute SINCHI presented a proposal for the environmental zoning of the territories 
affected by Law 2 of 1959, (Amazonian Forest Reserve Law). 
28 Verdad Abierta (12 Novembre 2018), « Programa de sustitución voluntaria de hoja de coca en estado 
crítico », https://verdadabierta.com/programa-de-sustitucion-voluntaria-de-hoja-de-coca-en-estado-critico/.   See also  La Silla Vacia (4 March 2019), « Los cocaleros del sur cumplieron y vuelven a 
mostrarle los dientes a Duque », https://lasillavacia.com/silla-sur/los-cocaleros-del-sur-cumplieron-y-
vuelven-mostrarle-los-dientes-duque-70317https://lasillavacia.com/silla-sur/los-cocaleros-del-sur-
cumplieron-y-vuelven-mostrarle-los-dientes-duque-70317 According to information from the PNIS,  in the 
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the colonization frontiers of Caqueta and Putumayo, the civil presence of the State was not visbly 
increased and many areas left by the FARC have been re-occupied by other armed actors 
(dissidents, criminal organizations). This questions even more the viability of the aim of halting 
further deforestation through erradicating the illicit crops as suggested by the final agreement. 
2.1.3 Access to land and rights? 
A fourth characteristic in the two departments has been the debates around the issue of access to 
land and securing land rights.  
 
According to the Final Agreement, one of the main instruments for access to land and securing the 
rights to land is the creation of a Land Fund, operating under the Ministry for Agriculture and 
Rural Development. After ascertaining that « Nothing established in the Agreement affects the 
constitutional right to private property” (Final agreement, p. 13), the final text specifies that land 
for the Rural Reform Land Fund would come from the following sources  : land arising from the 
legal cessation of ownership in favour of the Nation; land recovery in favour of the Nation 
(unoccupied public land (baldíos), unduly appropriated or occupied; land arising from the 
modification of the limits of the Forest reserve areas and other protected areas; unexploited land 
(with compensation); and donated land (Final Agreement p.15). Other measures foreseen in the 
agreement for promoting acces to land are: acces to comprehensive purchase subsidy; special 
purchase credit; special rights of use and finally land restitution (Final Agreement, p. 15). Large-
scale titling of small and medium sized rural property, would then protect the legal rights for small 
and medium-sized properties. No measures are foreseen to tackle speculation. No measures are 
foreseen to tackle land concentration (in the case of legally acquiered land). The Land Fund was 
created under Decree Law 902 on 29 May 2017.  
 
This Decree 902 is rather astonishing. The decree foresees distributing 3 million hectares and also 
regularizing 7 million hectares over 12 years (p. 12). However, the decree  widens the categories 
and thus the number of potential beneficiaires as follows : (i) those who might access to land and 
land regularisation for free -the original beneficiaries of land reform policies in Colombia, and also 
those intended in the final agreement- ; ii) those, better endowed, who might access to land and 
land regularization paying a partial contribution ; and iii) those, so well endowed that they might 
access, but only to land regularization and paying its full costs. If a focus is made on the issue of 
access to the regularization of land (the 7 million ha), we observe that  the housegolds in category 
1 will have to share the same rare implementation capacities of an underfunded Land Fund -and 
thus compete with- households in situations 2 and 3. If a focus is made on access to land through 
adjudication,  the decree 902 specifies that 800.000 rural households are landless (according to 
Dane, 2011 mentioned on p. 3). If these 800.000 households are compared to the 3 million ha 
planned for adjudication, this would mean around 3,75 ha per household, thus perpetuating a class 
of probably inviable micro landholders. Either the number of landless households has mysteriously 
                                               
Department of Caquetá , as of November 2018, there were 12950 families linked to the program, of whom 
6535 were actively participating, of these, 5774 were family farmers and 661 were non-farmers. To date 
2878 families have been suspended due to missing personal identification documents and/or the lack of 
basic evidence proving their relation to the parcels being taken into account by PNIS. 
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shrinked since 2011, either the amount of ha intended for adjudication (3 Million) has been starkly 
underestimated.  
 
In the two departements, the following questions then arise : are these proposals adapted to the 
circumstances? Would property formalization be the answer ? Would additional land be available 
for attribution in these departments? 
 
In the case of Caquetá this could be cumbersome. Indeed, in Caquetá, formally, access to land and 
resources in the department is restricted. According to the Geographic Institute Agustín Codazzi, 
of the 9,010,289 hectares of the department only 1,227,952 hectares, i.e. 13% of the area of the 
department are soils with some capacity for productive development29, 70% should be earmarked 
for activities with little environmental impact and the remaining should be reserved for protection. 
However, between 1903 and 2012 the Colombian State freely attributed 1,625,611 hectares of 
public lands (baldíos) – that is, more land than that may be viably used for productive 
development- to around 30,470 households.  By 2012, 26742 plots on 1,855,828 hectares were 
registered in the rural cadastre of Caquetá30.  
 
According to the PATR for Caquetá, 28% of the departmental area corresponds to protected areas, 
of this 28%, 15% corresponds to national protected areas and 13% to departmental and municipal 
protection figures. 1% of the departmental area corresponds to the Departmental System. of 
Protected Areas. 7% of the area corresponds to indigenous lands. 2% corresponds to Peasant 
Reserve Zones. The 3% corresponds to the District for the Conservation of Soils and Waters. 
Several of these areas overlap with the Forest Reserve Zone. One case occurs in the Pato Peasant 
Reserve Zone (ZRC). Its development plan did not foresee the need to timely engage in the 
procedure for the substraction of the ZRC area from the area of the forest reserve. As a 
consequence,  30% of this peasant reserve zone (ZRC) is now officially situated in a forest reserve. 
There are several cases of private properties that are duly registered and that can be found within 
the protected areas. Only a few public lands (baldíos) can be found outside or around the 
aforementioned protected areas.  
One of the possible sources of land foreseen in the Land Fund support programmes is land recovery 
in favour of the Nation (unoccupied public land (baldíos), unduly appropriated or occupied). 
Indeed, Caquetá is one of the oldest colonization region in the Colombian Amazon and most of 
the baldíos are occupied.  In 2016, INCODER (recently transformed into the Rural Development 
Agency, ADR), through resolution 810, identified a large baldío (280.000 ha) in Caquetá, 
supposedly belonging to FARC. This baldío was so large that it embraced the municipalities of 
San Vicente del Caguán and Macarena and even included  the already created Peaseant Reserve 
                                               29	See IGAC (16 september 2016) Caquetá, territorio con el potencial productivo más “destacable” en la 
Amazonia colombiana, https://noticias.igac.gov.co/es/contenido/caqueta-territorio-con-el-potencial-
productivo-mas-destacable-en-la-amazonia-colombiana-0 https://noticias.igac.gov.co/es/contenido/caqueta-territorio-con-el-potencial-productivo-mas-destacable-en-la-amazonia-colombiana-0. 30	When contrasting the adjudications with the records of the superintendent's notarial office, the autors 
found that by 2012, this entity has only registered 17,305 properties, which shows that almost 43% of the 
beneficiaries of vacant land did not register their property.	
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Zone Pato Balsillas and the foreseen ZRC Losada Guayabero. The announcement that the 
government had already found 280000 ha for the future land fund caused uproar all over the area 
: academics and peasant representatives argued that although FARC held political and military 
control over this territory, this would not mean that the land was theirs (and could thus be 
“returned” to the land fund for eventual redistribution). Others argued that this land was occupied 
by peasants, even before the presence of FARC in the area, and that the fact that they lived in 
territories controlled by FARC did not transform them in middlemen or land administrators for 
this organisation. In any case, this discussion illustrated how difficult it will be to identify the 
sources of land for the land fund, without relevant and widely accepted land surveys31 given that 
this region is inhabited by indigenous groups who claim a millenary presence, and peasants, some 
of whom have a history of settlement of more than 100 years 32.  
In both Putumayo and Caquetá, the alternative of offering subsidies or credit for the buying of land 
will be hampered by the speculatory prices of titled land. Land laying outside the protected areas 
and that are already titled, can indeed be found, but mainly around the main cities and along the 
main roads, in the so called consolidated areas. This titled land is expensive because of the 
speculation generated by cyclical surges in the illicit drug value chains or in the licit value-chains 
of the extractive activities (mining, oil and gas) and their financial impacts at the local level 
(provoking true local “dutch diseases” -refer to the literature on the “resource curse”). While 
decree 902 ackowledges the existence of speculation (beneficiaries might therefor not resell 
attributed land before 7 years), it does not foresee any specific instrument to effectively deal with 
this phenomena. If subsidies and credit would not be adequate, in view of the caracteristics of the 
land market, what are the remaining means of accessing land in the two departments? 
One option indicated in the final agreement has generated huge expectations. It concerns the 
possibility to accede to land through “rights of use”, a tool which would be particularly suited for 
land occupants inside and around the protected areas. However, recent cases in Caquetá, Putumayo 
and Meta illustrate the difficulties of implementation of this tool. Occupants settled in a limited 
area of the Natural Park Cordillera de los Picachos (Caquetá) argued that they arrived in public 
lands (baldíos) before the creation of the protected area and that their mode of production (in one 
case, including livestock) has been sustainable since their settling in. Based thereon, they demand 
rights of use that respect both their legal status and their livelihood. However, environmental 
authories have objected the delivery of these rights : they argue that large livestock grazing in a 
natural park is a risk for biodiversity. Likewise, they argue that while the present situation is 
                                               31	It should be noted that none of the two departments has been selected for a pilot cadaster project and 
that activities related to access to land and land security went mostly unnoticed in the two departments.	
32 In 2013 the national government financed the third census for agriculture and livestock, a valuable 
instrument in view of the latter implementation of the final agreement. As in other departments,  in 
Caquetá the recopilation of data did not went smoothly, because of the opposition of the “Cumbre 
Agraria”, a network and lobby bringing together most of the independent peasant organisations in 
Colombia. Their argument concerned the categories utilized in the census : the category “peasant” did 
not even appear, and Cumbre Agraria asked its members not to respond the questionnaires. See : “Las 
organizaciones campesinas de la Cumbre Agraria rechazan el censo nacional agropecuario y llaman a no 
responderlo” https://prensarural.org/spip/spip.php?article14154.  
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already unstable, with a limited capacity to control new demographic inflow, including by the 
communities themselves, it could get worse, once access via rights of use will be officialized33.  
While access to land remains essential for those desiring and- are able- to engage in agricultural 
production, it is only one of the solutions to a wider problem, the rising number of unemployed in 
the two departments. In Caqueta and Putumayo, extractive industries provide few employment 
opportunities for the local workforce (except during the short phase of construction of 
infrastructures). Employment in the service sector is stagnating. Agro industrial and industrial 
transformation is incipient or non-existent. Unemployment in the two departements is further fed 
by three concurrent phenomens : displaced populations (from the departments or elsewhere); 
producers and workers abandoning the illicit value chains34; demography; and the arrival of former 
combattants on the labour market. 
2.1.4 Economic and social re-integration of former combattants, a variety of 
situations	
The issue of economic and social integration of former combattants “was probably given too little 
attention during the talks” (Nylander, Sandberg, Tvedt, 2018, p. 6). In fact, there is no analysis of 
the problem of urban and rural under or unemployment, and neither on the probleme of inequities 
regarding  access to productive assets and the consequence for the distribution of income. The 
Final Agreement has narrowed to the issue of access to land and emphasized that integration should 
be mainly associative and less individual. Consequently, the situation of former combattants 
greatly varies in the two departments, from no integration at all, to simply looking for any 
unqualified job available outside the ETCR, till developing sophisticated production processes (on 
or off farm). The main factor distinguishing the situation of former combattants is whether they 
are still related to, or completely out of the initial ETCR scheme (the law does not oblige former 
combattants to remain attached to their initial ETCRs). For former combattants outside the ETCR, 
employment may be found, but probably as salaried workers with low levels of qualification and 
remuneration (at least in the licit activities). For former combattants within the ETCR, the main 
distinguishing factors are whether the ETCR has access to productive assets and the security of 
this access.  Former combattants in ETCR Agua Bonita started their rural but off farm activity with 
tools for the production of leather goods that were temporarily lended to them;  land was 
temporaliy rented by the government in the case of the ETCR la Carmelita, Putumayo, while 
former combattants in ETCR Agua Bonita secured access to an associative purchase. Once these 
productive activities emerged, further technical and financial assistance – mainly provided thanks 
to international cooperation- helped them consolidate their activities (see Table 2. Former 
combattants : a variety of situations in Caquetá and Putumayo) . 
 
 
                                               33	Meanwhile, illegal occupation by new and unruly settlers undermine the authority of the State in the 
neighboring Department of Meta	 	 	 https://www.rcnradio.com/recomendado-del-editor/denuncian-
apropiacion-ilegal-de-tierras-en-los-parques-tinigua-y-la-macarena	34	Bungard, Koleia. “Así fue la historia de la coca en Caquetá, Colombia. Tres relatos desde el territorio.” 
Diario de Paz Colombia (blog), March 25, 2018. https://diariodepaz.com/2018/03/25/historia-de-la-coca-
en-caqueta/. 
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Table 2. Former combattants : a variety of situations in Caquetá and Putumayo 
Former 
combattants that 
are out of any  
ETCR Individual 
initiatives 
Unqualified 
employment in 
agriculture 
Employed but 
not always 
integegrated.  
Unqualified 
employment in 
urban areas (with 
or without 
support from the 
ANR) 
Employed, but 
integrated? 
Employment 
elsewhere 
(unknown) 
Not integrated 
 
Former 
combattants still 
affiliated to an 
ETCR, with 
productive 
assetts 
ETCR with land 
and water (with 
financial and 
technical support 
for productive 
activities, 
associated 
reintegration, 
(ETCR Agua 
Bonita, Caqueta, 
secured access to 
100 ha through 
associated 
purchase, 
aquaculture, 
poultry, 
pineapple, 
bananas, etc.); 
ETCR Heiler 
Mosquera, La 
Carmelita, 
Putumayo 
(horticulture, 
poultry, 10ha, 
temporarily 
rented by 
government) 
With rural off-
farm activities 
(leather 
products, boots, 
outdoor gear), 
with technical 
and financial 
support, 
associated 
reintegration, 
(ETCR Agua 
Bonita, Caqueta) 
Without land, 
without rural off-
farm activities, 
former 
combattants 
working outside 
(see above) but 
regularly 
returning to the 
ETCR, 
individual “re-
integration?” 
(ETCR Heiler 
Mosquera, la 
Carmelita, 
Putumayo) 
Without land, 
without rural off-
farm activities, 
unoccupied in or 
outside the 
ETCR, former 
combattants not 
integrated 
(ETCR Heiler 
Mosquera, La 
Carmelita, 
Putumayo) 
Former 
combattants still 
affiliated to 
ETCR, but 
without 
productive assets 
other than labour 
Unqualified 
labour outside 
the ETCR 
Professionnal 
training in the 
ETCR 
Regroupment 
towards other 
ETCR with 
productive 
assets;  
Leaving the 
ETCR  
 
For the few dozens former combattants who had access to productive assets and the opportunity 
to learn and apply new skills and thus generate income through productive on- or off-farm 
activities, integration is probably already starting. For the hundreds others in Caquetá and 
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Putumayo, the situation remains uncertain and full of risks35. A recent report was elaborated by 
researchers from ICANH and the University of Rosario, regarding the situation in the ETCR la 
Carmelita, Putumayo. The text reveals that inactivity, lack of economic and political perspectives 
and also lack of field presence of the leaders of the former combattants party, multiplies the 
individual situations of despair and dismotivation (ICANH, Universidad del Rosario, 2018). The 
selection of the site choosen for the establishment of the ETCR has been criticized in the case of 
La Carmelita, Putumayo : the issue of social and economic integration was visibly not central when 
choosing the sites for the establishment of the ETCR36. Visits to the different ETCRs thus confirm 
the opportunities that peace could bring but also how fragile the post-agreement process still is.  	
In order to summarize our review of the implementation issues in the two departments, the auteurs 
focus on the questions repeteadly asked by the interviewed resource persons from the region :  
wereas they belong to two departments most directly involved in the conflict, why were they not 
better informed and why did implementation reach them so slowly, mainly through plans that look 
like remaining on the shelves?  
The authors will try to answer this enquiry by successively reviewing the negotiation process and 
its immediate result (the text of the agreement), then the financial, institutional and organizational 
measures taken by National Government, thenceforth the role of the international community in 
implementation and finally the implications of these three dimensions for implementation. 
2.2. The negotiation process and its effect on the differential quality of the several 
components of the Final Agreement 
2.2.1 Asymmetries during the negotiation process and implications 
Despite the early and stimulating contributions by Herbolzheimer (2016), Segura and Mechoulan 
(2017) and Nylander, Sandberg and Tvedt (2018), the literature on the negotiation process is still 
relatively scarce. This may be explained by the secrecy of the first negotiating phases 
(Herbolzheimer, 2016; Nylander, Sandberg and Tvedt, 2018). Nevertheless the points of view of 
the different negociators are partially reflected by the colombian news papers37. The Office of the 
High Commissioner for Peace has recently released 10 volumes of digitalized information on the 
                                               35		“Tan sólo 87 exguerrilleros de Farc cuentan con proyectos productivos apoyados por el Estado.” Verdad 
Abierta (blog), September 23, 2018. https://verdadabierta.com/tan-solo-87-exguerrilleros-de-farc-
cuentan-con-proyectos-productivos-apoyados-por-el-estado/. 36	If the central criterium was security, this has also been questioned in several sites. 
37  https://www.eltiempo.com/bocas/entrevista-con-sergio-jaramillo-alto-comisionado-para-la-paz-
durante-el-proceso-con-las-farc-121266.  . “‘Se están tirando el proceso de paz’: Humberto de la Calle.” 
Caracol Radio, April 29, 2018. 
http://caracol.com.co/radio/2018/04/29/politica/1525032510_227021.html. See also the Intervención 
by Iván Marquéz, chief negociator for FARC. 
“Márquez reapareció en video y lamentó dejar las armas antes de asegurar reincorporación,” January 12, 
2019. http://www.wradio.com.co/noticias/actualidad/marquez-reaparecio-en-video-y-lamento--dejar-
las-armas-antes-de-asegurar-reincorporacion/20190112/nota/3849231.aspx. 
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peace process with the FARC38. The documentary “The Negotiation” directed by Margarita 
Martínez (201839 provides also additional insights. A new publication on the negotiation process 
has been announced, but is not yet available (National University, forthcoming). The available 
information indicates that asymmetries were perceivable. In particular, the capacity of the two 
participating parties to deal with external advice was imbalanced40.  
One specific issue illustrates the sometimes strenuous relations between the Farc negociating team 
and its advisers (i.a. the academy). It was about the socalled Peasant Reserve Zones (Zonas de 
Reserva Campesina, ZRC), The modality of ZRC was first openly asked for during the peasant 
mobilizations of 1996.  The basic idea behind the ZRC was to create, for peasants, a form of access 
to- and control over- land and resources, very similar to the role played by the Indigenous and 
Afrocolombian Territories already recognized in the Constitution. The idea was to create these 
ZRC specifically in those areas were other forms of access would not preserve the permanence of 
small holders (because of speculation, or because of the fact that these lands were situated in or 
around protected areas). It was formalized in 1996 through decree 1777, were-in the ZRC were 
presented as a way to insure environmental friendly practices (around waterways and in 
watersheds) in the frame of Law 160 of 1994 (Fajardo, 2002). The first ZRCs were created between 
1998 and 1999 (Pato Balsillas in Caquetá and Calamar in Guaviare). During the two terms of 
Uribe´s presidency  the whole idea of ZRCs was dismissed. Nevertheless, at the start of  the talks 
in La Havana, the idea of the ZRC returned on the negotiation table, thanks, among others, to Dario 
Fajardo, a recognized academic who had been patiently acompanying and studying the 
implementation of the ZRCs (Fajardo, 2002, 2018).  
In 2012, via INCODER, the National Government started to provide technical assistance to the 
ZRC already recognized in Pato Balsillas (San Vicente del Caguán, Caquetá). In the same year, 
the process was launched for the constitution of the ZRC Losada Guayabero (on the limits between 
Caquetá and Meta).  The experimentation with the modality of ZRC was thus underway. Yet, 
during the negotiations in la Havana,  in March 2013 the FARC presented and defended the idea 
of ZRC´s in a way such, that it created outrage from ministers, representatives of political parties 
and representatives of the large producers unions alike41. Finally, through pressure from peasant 
                                               38 10	 volumes	 of	 information	 are	 accessible	 via	 the	 following	 link	http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Prensa/Paginas/2018/Biblioteca-del-Proceso-de-Paz-con-las-Farc-EP.aspx,	accessed	12	march	2019.		
39 Canal	Capital	Bogota.	Entrevista	con	Margarita	Martínez	-	Documental	La	Negociación.	Accessed	December	3,	2018.	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lEP1eXHYoNI.	
40 «	From	the	very	start	of	the	negotiation	there	was	a	clear	asymmetry	between	government	and	the	FARC.	The	government	has	extensive	access	to	experts	both	within	and	outside	the	state	aparatus	-whereas	the	FARC	initially	had	to-	and	preferred	to-	rely	on	internal	resources	»	(Nylander,	Sandberg	and	Tvedt,	2018,	p.	4).	«	The	government	relied	on	the	advice	of,	among	others,		international	experts	Joaquin	 Villalobos,	 William	 Ury,	 Jonathan	 Powell	 and	 Shlomo	 Ben-Ami.	 The	 FARC	 received	substantial	 inputs	 from	 both	 Colombian	 and	 international	 experts	 and	 academics	»	 (Nylander,	Sandberg	and	Tvedt,	2018,	p.	4,	footnote	14). 
41 In	march	2013,	during	the	negotiation	in	Havana	of	Point	1	Comprehensive	Rural	Reform,	instead	of	 simply	 referring	 to	 the	 already	 constitutionally	 allowed	 functioning	 of	 the	 indigenous	 and	afrocolombian	 territories,	 the	 FARC	 suggested	 that	 the	 “Los	 territorios	 campesinos	 gozarán	 de	
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organizations and with the support of academy, the idea of the ZRC was reintroduced on the table 
and preserved in the agreeement, at least in theory (no new ZRC´s have been initiated since). The 
acceptation of the modality of ZRC  was immediately balanced by the consolidation of similar 
schemes for the development of  large agriculture projects -and those were indeed created in 
several areas of Colombia since the agreement-42. 
The asymmetries in terms of negotiation savy and resources were felt stronger around some issues, 
which was then translated in imbalances in the “quality” of the respective chapters.  
2.2.2 The imprecise nature of the formulation of the rural dimension in the Final 
Agreement 
By “quality” we refer to the preciseness not only of the guiding principles and ideas, but of all 
agreed measures (institutional, organizational and financial modifications) and operations on the 
ground, in terms of : what is exactly to be implemented, in which order, how, when, where, by 
whom, if relevant, financed how? Indeed, while the protocols and annex of the section “Agreement 
on the Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities and Laying Down of Arms” 
and its annexed protocols are utterly detailed and precisely answer these questions, the Chapter 
“Towards a New Colombian Countryside: Comprehensive Rural reform” remains at an imprecise 
and discursive level, despite the detailed technical report of the Misión para la Transformación del 
Campo (DNP, 2016) that has visibly inspired Chapter 1. 
The question remains why, once the discussions of the protocols on laying down arms and justice 
led to such detailed accords, chapter 1 on RRI and the section Reintegration in chapter 3 were not 
reviewed and completed by the negociators (despite having access to recognized experts in rural 
development and to the recent report of the Misión para la Transformación del Campo (DNP, 
2016), thus creating a visible imbalance in the relative precision throughout the agreement. This 
is the more surprising in view of the fact that the principle adopted for negotiation was  « nothing 
is agreed until everything is agreed » (Herbolheimer, 2016, p. 2 ; Segura and Mechoulan, 2017, p. 
                                               autonomía	política,	administrativa,	económica,	social,	ambiental	y	cultural,	y	en	la	administración	de	justicia	 a	 través	 de	 los	 mecanismos	 de	 la	 justicia	 comunitaria.	 La	 autonomía	 se	 comprende	 en	términos	de	la	capacidad	de	autogobierno,	autogestión	y	autodeterminación,	enmarcada	dentro	del	ordenamiento	constitucional	que	resulte	del	nuevo	contrato	social	pactado	en	la	Asamblea	Nacional	Constituyente”.	Based	on	this,	they	proposed	the	creation	of	59	ZRC´s	covering	9	Million	Ha…	The	Minister	for	Agriculture	responded	that	there	would	be	no	way	to	create	ZRC’s	with	an	autonomy	even	Departments	don´t	dispose	of.	Likewise	he	argued	that	creating	«	independant	republics	»	all	over	the	country	would	be	against	law,	(Ramírez,	2017).	42 Refer	 to	 the	 Zonas	 de	 Interés	 de	 Desarrollo	 Rural,	 Económico	 y	 Social	 (ZIDRES)	 :		https://upra.gov.co/sala-de-prensa/noticias/-/asset_publisher/GEKyUuxHYSXZ/content/arranca-el-mapa-de-las-zidreshttps://www.elespectador.com/economia/creada-por-decreto-la-primera-zidres-del-pais-articulo-803982	;	“El	silencio	de	Duque	frente	a	la	política	de	tierras.”	Cerosetenta,	September	30,	2018.	https://cerosetenta.uniandes.edu.co/el-silencio-de-duque-frente-a-la-politica-de-tierras/;	 https://www.oxfam.org/es/colombia-las-falacias-detras-de-zidres-una-ley-de-subdesarrollo-rural; https://www.farmlandgrab.org/post/view/28113-colombia-por-que-la-ley-zidres-es-anticampesinos	
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15 ; Nylander, Sandberg and Tvedt, 2018, p.3). The application of this principle would thus have 
allowed the negociators to return to- and improve upon- the earlier agreed sections of the 
agreement.  In fact, the main reason why some chapters are more elaborate than others is 
convingcingly explained by Nylander, Sandberg and Tvedt :  “the goal of the talks was to end the 
conflict in order to contribute to the establishment of a stable and lasting peace. This was an 
important distinction and allowed the parties to focus on topics that were strictly necessary to 
end the conflict and differentiate these topics from what would be desirable elements for 
building peace” (Nylander, Sandberg and Tvedt, 2018, p. 4).  43. Thus, the “elements for building  
a lasting peace”, among which those related to the rural dimension of the agreement, were too 
frequently left at the level of intentions. 
 
Another reason for not reworking on chapter 1 on RRI may have been that the negociators 
underwent the pressure of time44. Thousands of visitors made it to the negotiators in La Havana. 
The creation of sub-commissions, with intensive schedules, although speading up the reaching of 
agreements, led to exhaustion and fatigue45 among those involved (Nylander, Sandberg and Tvedt, 
2018, p. 5-6); it also meant shredding the already scarce negotiation capacities of those negociators 
interested in the “desirable elements for building lasting peace” and who were confronted with a 
text that grew at unreasonable length as time went by.  
 
Colombia is one of the countries with the highest level of unequality regarding income and  access 
to land. If during the past years the guerrilla movements could not resolve these phenomens when 
armed, instead -war created the condition for the largest land grabbings in Colombian history-, 
how could they generate measures for the reduction regarding land concentration during the 
negotiation ? In view of the respective power balance at the signature of the agreement, it was thus 
not to be expected that a land reform be announced. For government, the red negotiation lines were 
numerous : no massive land distribution but restricted land attribution and land regularization; 
                                               43	The	 Final	 Agreement	 reflects	 the	 heavy	 debates	 around	 this	 distinction.	 “Noticing	 that,	 in	 the	opinion	of	the	National	Government,	the	transformations	that	must	be	achieved	when	implementing	this	Agreement	must	play	a	part	in	reversing	the	effects	of	the	conflict	and	in	changing	the	conditions	that	have	led	to	the	persistence	of	violence	across	the	country;	and,	in	the	opinion	of	the	FARC-EP,	such	transformations	must	contribute	to	resolving	the	historical	causes	of	the	conflict,	such	as	the	unresolved	issue	of	land	ownership	and,	in	particular,	the	concentration	thereof,	the	exclusion	of	the	rural	population,	and	the	underdevelopment	of	rural	communities,	which	especially	affects	women,	girls	and	boys”(	final	Agreement,	p.	3). 
44 «	A	 topic	 that	was	probably	 given	 too	 little	 attention	during	 the	 talks	was	 the	 reintegration	of	former	combattants.	Reintegration	has	normally	been	the	least	successful	dimension	in	Colombian	peace	processes	and	has	resulted	in	fresh	cycles	of	violence.	The	issue	was	not	sufficiently	defined	in	the	 peace	 agreement	 partly	 because	 of	 time	 constraints,	 and	 partly	 because	 of	 very	 different	perspectives	on	how	it	should	be	resolved	»	(Nylander,	Sandberg	and	Tvedt,	2018,	p.	6). 
45 After	 the	 referendum	 of	 2	 October	 2016	 and	 the	 need	 to	 negociate	 again	 the	 already	 «	final	»	agreement	with	FARC-EP	 in	order	 to	 take	 into	account	 the	voices	of	 the	winning	«	No	»	coalition,	Sergio	Jaramillo	(High	Peace	Commissioner)	recalls	that	«	Además	todo	el	mundo	estaba	agotado,	nadie	podía	creer	que	teníamos	que	volver	a	esto.	Al	final	la	gente	estaba	tirada	en	los	sofás,	dormida	del	 cansancio.	» (https://www.eltiempo.com/bocas/entrevista-con-sergio-jaramillo-alto-comisionado-para-la-paz-durante-el-proceso-con-las-farc-121266). 
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respect private property when acquisition was legal, whatever the level of land concentration and 
whatever the speculative process, etc. : under these parameters the Colombian land equation might 
be difficult if not impossible to resolve, the more because the traditional solution to land demands 
practicised since the fifties in Colombia (colonization instead of land reform46), has attained its 
limits (at least if government wants to preserve some of the remaining forest in the Amazon). What 
came out of the agreement and the subsequent legislative texts might thus not be concomitant with 
the nature of the problems faced, at least in the two departments studied. 
 
Whatever the reason, the lack of preciseness in some sections of the agreement, and more 
specifically the financial dimension of implementation, were supposed to be resolved through the 
later elaboration of a Framework Plan for Implementation of the Agreement (PMI, which would 
remain in force for ten years and would be yearly reviewed by a Commission for Monitoring, 
promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement (CSIVI)47 in order to make 
appropriate ajustments48 (Final agreement, 2016, p.  20849).   
2.2.3 An also elusive Framework Plan for Implementation of the Agreement (PMI) 
The first version of the PMI, was indeed prepared by the Colombian Government and discussed 
with and agreed upon by the CSIVI by 13 december 2017. As convened, the PMI was attached as 
annex B to the National Social and Economic Policy Council (CONPES) document 3932 (29 june 
2018). Despite the intense discussions within the CSIVI, around the need to be more precise, this 
initial version of the PMI did not meet the challenge  of indicating measurable and milestones 
                                               46	An approach supported by the World Bank though the INCORA project in Caqueta in the sixties.	
47 The	members	of	the	CSIVI	that	approved	the	initial	version	of	the	PMI	were	Rafael	Pardo,	Rodrigo	Rivera	and	Guillermo	Rivera	as	representatives	for	the	National	Government,		and	Victoria	Sandino,	Jesús	 Santrich	 and	 Iván	 Márquez	 in	 representation	 of	the	 party	 FARC	(https://csivi.co/implementacion-territorial/que-es-csivi	accessed	1	february	2019). 
48 Formally,	this	means	that	the	existing	PMI	is	only	a	first	version	and	may	indeed	be	adjusted	each	year. 
49 «	After	the	signing	of	the	agreement	and	in	order	to	guarantee	the	implementation	of	everything	agreed	-policies,	regulations,	plans	and	programmes-	and	to	facilitate	follow-up	and	verification,	the	Commission	 for	Monitoring,	promoting	and	Verifying	 the	 Implementation	of	 the	Final	Agreement	(CSIVI)	will	discuss	and	approve,	within	4	months	following	its	constitution,	a	Framework	Plan	for	the	 Implementation	of	 the	Agreements	 on	 the	basis	 of	 the	draft	 to	 be	 submitted	by	 the	National	Government	»	Final	Agreement,	2016,	p.	208. 
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(CGR, 2018, p. 133). Many milestones have unprecise timings50, or with irrealistic milestones51. 
Surprisingly, in several of the monitoring reports around the implementation of the peace 
agreement (see table 1), when the intention was to make a cualitative and quantitative comparison 
between what “was agreed” and progress so far, the lists of measures and “indicators” were 
extracted directly from the text of the final agreement or with reference to the PMI, independently 
of the degree of preciseness in the formulation of these texts52.  
 
 
 
                                               
50 A	few	examples	:	«	The	Government	will	form	a	group	of	three	experts	on	the	subject	of	access	to	land	to	put	forward,	within	a	term	not	exceeding	three	months,	recommendations	for	policy	reforms	and	 public	 policy	 that	 allow,	 within	 a	 limited	 period	 and	whenever	 possible	 (sic):	 The	 rights	 of	property	 owners,	 occupants	 and	holders	 in	 good	 faith	 to	 be	 regulated,	 provided	 that	 there	 is	 no	dispossession	or	bad	faith;	The	social	and	ecological	function	of	ownership	to	be	guaranteed;	Access	by	workers	without	land	or	with	insufficient	land	to	be	facilitated;	Promotion	of	productive	use	of	the	 land;	The	proposals	 for	 regulatory	amendments	 to	 land	 legislation	and	public	policy	must	be	discussed	 with	 the	 sectors	 involved	 in	 order	 to	 seek	 the	 broadest	 possible	 consensus	 prior	 to	discussion	in	the	Congress	of	the	Republic”	(Final	Agreement,	2016,	p.	17).	While	specifying	the	three	months	available	for	the	group	to	come	up	with	these	proposals,	no	starting	date	is	precised,	neither	the	 logistical	 and	 organizational	 arrangements.	 The	 PMI	 does	 indeed	 mention	 this	 group,	 to	 be	installed	between	year	2	and	10….	Three	million	ha	will	be	distributed	by	the	Land	Fund	;	the	PMI	(p.	25)	specifies	the	timing	:	between	year	1	and	12….	Another	example	:	“The	Colombian	government	and	 the	FARC-EP	will	…	 convene	a	meeting	of	 all	parties,	political	 and	 social	movements,	 and	all	driving	forces	of	the	country	with	the	aim	of	reaching	a	NATIONAL	POLITICAL	AGREEMENT	designed	to	set	out	the	institutional	modifications	and	reforms	that	are	needed	to	meet	the	challenges	required	by	 the	 peace	 	 (…)	 (p.7	 of	 the	 Final	 Agreement).	 The	 PMI	 suggests	 that	 this	 essential	 National	Agreement	be	reached	between	year	1	and	5…	under	responsibility	of	the	Minister	of	Interior…	”A	counter	example	of	a	precise	agreement	in	the	RRI	chapter	:	“The	National	Government	will,	within	two	years,	implement	an	environmental	zoning	plan	to	delimit	the	agricultural	frontier	and	to	enable	updating,	 and	 where	 necessary,	 expanding	 the	 inventory,	 and	 to	 characterize	 the	 use	 of	 areas	requiring	proper	environmental	management	(…),”	Final	Agreement,	2016,	p.	20.	The	PMI	indicates	that	this	will	be	implemented	within	2	years	by	the	Ministry	of	Environment	(progress	has	indeed	been	observed	in	Caqueta	and	Putumayo). 
51 An	example	of	 an	over	ambitious	aim	 :	 “In	2022,	 the	areas	 covered	by	 the	National	 Illicit	Crop	Substitution	 Programme	 (PNIS)	 will	 be	 100%	 free	 of	 illicit	 crops”	 (Framework	 Plan	 for	Implementation	of	the	Agreements	(PMI),	2018,	p.17). 
52 This	may	explain	the	reaction	from	Prof.	Jairo	Estrada,	one	of	the	representatives	of	Farc	in	the	CISVI	:	 «	Nosotros	 no	 queremos	 "kroquizar"	 la	 implementación	 del	 Acuerdo	 de	 Paz,	 nos	 parece	desacertado	ponerle	números	y	porcentajes	a	este	proceso	que	es	tan	complejo”	(1	december	2017,	https://twitter.com/csivifarc) 
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2.3 Financial, institutional and organizational arrangements for the implementation of 
the rural dimension of the Final Agreement 
2.3.1 The Colombian State : despite abundant plans and elaborate systems, 
entangled financing, deficient steering 
The quality of the arrangements fast-tracked by government,  in view of launching the 
implementation  of the Final Agreement, has been often been taken for granted (with one 
exception, CGR, 2018), instead of giving these another scrutiny. Taking into account the existing 
literature, we will successively focus on some specific features of the financial, institutional and 
organizational arrangements and how they may hamper present and future implementation if no 
modificatory measures are taken. 
 
Financial arrangements 
The overall costs of the implementation of the PMI over 10 years were estimated at 129.6 billion 
pesos 2016. The government identified the following sources of financing : 46.7 billion pesos 2016 
from the General Budget of the Nation (Presupuesto General de la Nación, PGN); 47.7 billion peso 
2016 from the General Participations System (Sistema General de Participaciones, SGP), regulated 
by law 715 from 2001;  18,1 billions peso 2016 from the General Royalties System ; 11.6 billion 
pesos 2016 from international cooperation; 4.3 billion pesos 2016 from the own resources of 
decentralized goverments – departments and municipalities- and 1,2 billion pesos 2016 from 
private investments (CONPES 3952, 2018, p.13). However, the announced financing structure of 
the PMI is insincere. 
 
Of all these resources, only the 47.7 billion pesos 2016 (36 % of the total costs) coming from the 
General Budget of the Nation (PGN)  are really formally under control of the national government 
(CGR, 2018, p. 27)53. Notwithstanding, resources from the PGN are hampered by two factors. In 
the first place, whatever the source of public financing, the use of public resources is so 
overregulated that many able profesionals don’t want to be involved in public positions; the public 
procurement policies don’t favor local economies. The rampling overregulation, does not 
fundamentally reduce acts of true corruption (personal enrichment, embezzling of public funds) 
but instead, the way in which the definitions of corruption and mismanagement have been 
enlarged, leads to the politization of anti corruption policies and essentially incites public servants 
(governors, ministers, mayors, rectors, directors of public services…)  to avoid spending, instead 
of inciting them to resolve problems, for which they were supposedly designated. Secondly 
implementation is hampered by the so called Guarantee Law (Ley de Garantías) Number 996 dated 
2005, a law that aims at reducing the probability that candidates for national and territorial 
positions use public monies to influence voters during the electoral periods. As a result, during  4 
full months preceding each election (for president, governor, or mayor) no contracts involving 
public resources may be signed, paralyzing the State from nation to municipality. The law does 
not seem to be particularly effective in dealing with eventual corruption (mainly because there is 
no reason why eventual lawbrakers would not operate before or after the 4 month period). But in 
                                               
53   “Contraloría	 Hace	 Reparos	 a	 Los	 Recursos	 Para	 La	 Paz,”	 September	 20,	 2018.	http://www.wradio.com.co/noticias/actualidad/contraloria-hace-reparos-a-los-recursos-para-la-paz/20180920/nota/3802061.aspx. 
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a phase where a swift implementation of the final agreement was particularly crucial, these factors 
contributed to impede the actions deployed by those polititians who genuinely wished to contribute 
to the implementation of the agreement.  
 
Another large chunk of the announced resources for peace (the resources of the General 
Participations System) are in fact under the authority of descentralized sub-levels of government 
(municipalities, districts, departments) (CGR, 2018), who may spend those tied descentralized 
resources, only on certain items, under strict regulations and under close control54. Likewise, the 
resources from international cooperation are out of the scope of control by the National 
Government (the authors will examine the role of the international community in a later section). 
Mentioning the private sector as a source for investments for peace would have been a good idea, 
if the private sector had been previously consulted and had then explicitely pledged, which was 
not the case. The same is true for the so called  own resources of departments, districts and 
municipalities (mainly coming from local taxes): governors and mayors were not previously 
consulted, and the mentioned resources for the financing of the Final Agreement were not pledged 
by them. The situation of the General Royalties System is peculiar. It could have been an excellent 
source for the financing of the implementation of the PMI. However, as soon as something is called 
a system, things are never simple in the organization of the Colombian state. 
 
The General Royalties System was created through a modification dated 18 July 2011, of articles 
360 and 361 of the Constitution of the Republic of Colombia. Article 360 foresees that any 
explotation of a non-renewable natural resource will generate a royalty for the State and specifies 
that the conditions for the explotation of non renewable resources will be determined by law. 
Likewise it specifies that another law will determine the distribution, objectives, the goals, the 
administration, the implementation, control, efficient use and destination of the resources 
stemming from the explotation of non-renewable resources, including precisions on the conditions 
under which beneficiaries will participate.  The aggregate of incomes, allocations, organs, 
precedures and rules constitutes the General Royalties System (Constitución de la República 
Colombiana, Art. 360). So far, this is a relatively common approach for dealing with royalties 
when combined with production sharing contracts (mainly used in the oil and gaz sector).  
 
Notwithstanding the principle of the Treasury Single Account (TSA, “principio de unidad de 
caja”) suggested by the IMF (Lienert, 2009) and professed by the Ministry of Finances, Article 
361 of the Constitution states that the resources from the General Royalties55 System will not 
belong to the General Budget of the Nation, neither to the General Participations System (the tied 
and oriented resources resources for the decentralized territorial entities -departements, districts 
and municipalities), but will have their own budgetal system, to be determined by a Law.  
 
                                               
54  «	El	 Sistema	 General	 de	 Participaciones	 SGP	 está	 constituido	 por	 los	 recursos	 que	 la	 Nación	transfiere	 por	mandato	 de	 los	 artículos	 356	 y	 357	 de	 la	 Constitución	 Política	 de	 Colombia	 a	 las	entidades	territoriales	–	departamentos,	distritos	y	municipios,	para	la	financiación	de	los	servicios	a	 su	 cargo,	 en	 salud,	 educación	 y	 los	 definidos	 en	 el	 Artículo	 76	 de	 la	 Ley	 715	 de	 2001	»	http://www.shd.gov.co/shd/sistema-general-de-participaciones,	accessed	13	February	2019. 55	The	name	given	 to	 the	General	Royalty	System	may	not	be	accurate	:	 like	 taxes,	 royalties	are	a	source	of	public	income.	Once	they	are	incorporated	in	the	public	finances,	they	are	not	«	royalties	»	any	more,	but	just	public	resources,	like	all	other	public	resources,	whatever	their	origin. 
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The budget of the General Royalties System will be approved biannually by Congress 
(Constitución de la Républica de Colombia, Art. 361, Par. 1). Likewise, Art. 361 specifies that 
only those territorial entities in which non renewable natural resources are exploited and those 
through which these resources or their derivates are fluvially or maritimely transported, will have 
a directly assigned share in the resources of the General Royaties System. All other territorial 
entities may have access to the royalty resources, but on a competitive basis after submitting their 
project through elaborated procedures. The funds of the General Royalties System will be divided 
through an agreed and transparent repartition key. In principle, this is a positive feature (Gallego 
Maldonado, Trujillo, 2018) in a situation were the repartition of public resources is usually opaque. 
However, in practice  the repartition key was progressively made very difficult to understand and 
to monitor (see table 2 Initial repartition key for the General Royalties System and its modification 
after the signature of the final agreement). 
 
 
Table 2. Rules and initial repartition key for the General Royalties System and 
modifications after the signature of the Final Agreement  
(based on articles 360 and 361 of the Constitution, Law 1530 of 2012, and Legislative 
Act 4 of 8 septembre 2017) 
 Before the agreement 
(2011) 
After the agreement 
(2017) 
 % % % % % 
A. Total Royalties year X, 10
0 
    
B. Financial returns on A-I     70% of the financial returns 
generated by (A-I),  will be 
used to finance peace related 
projects, 
The 30% remaining of the 
interests will be added to I 
C. Monitoring of 
exploitation, geological 
knowledge and 
cartography of the subsoil 
2     
D. Monitoring system of 
the General Royalties 
System 
1     
Of the remaining 97 =100    
E. New : Till 2037, 
Specific Peace Assignment 
    7% (till the year 2037) 
F. Fund for science, 
technology and innovation 
 10   60% of the non approved 
saldos by 31/12/17, of the 
Fund for Science 
Technology and Innovation 
will be used to finance 
transport infrastructure 
foreseen under the Final 
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Agreement as follows : 50% 
to E and 50% to K  
G. Pensional Savings of 
Territorial Entities 
 10   Reduced to 7% 
If a territorial entity already 
covers its pensional 
obligations, it may invest the 
remaining funds in 
investment projects related 
to the implementation of the 
Final Agreement 
H1. Saving and 
Stabilisation Fund 
 0<x<30     
H2. Interests generated by 
the Saving and 
Stabilisation Fund 
     
      
Of the remaining  20 to 
50 
=100   
I. Direct attribution to 
territorial entities were 
exploitation occurs or were 
resources or derivates 
circulate through rivers and 
or ports 
  20   
Of the remaining   80 =100  
J. Fund for Regional 
Compensation 
in 2042, J transforms into K 
   60  
K. Fund for Regional 
Development 
   40  
Authorized Annual 
increase for amounts J and 
K = max 0,5 times the  
annual increase of A 
     
Remanents A-
(G+F+K+J+I) : add to H1 
    Remanents A-
(G+F+K+J+I+E) : add to H1 
If (H1+H2) > 30% of A, 
redistribute difference to 
other components 
     
 
These detailed rules for the repartition of royalties, not usually found at the level of a Constitution,  
were even further specified in	the Law	1530	(2012). Law 1530 states that the General Royalty 
System is created		in order to generate equity in the repartition of the financial resources generated 
by the exploitation of non renewable natural resources ; to save for later ; to facilitate counter-
cyclical policies and maintain the fluid  capacity for public investment over time ; to direct 
investments towards the poor and thus contribute to social equity ;  to promote development and 
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regional competitivity in all departments, districts and municipalities in view of the fact that the 
State is the owner of the sub-soil ;  to  facilitate the design of proyects that promote mining and 
energy projects, specifically small and middle scale and artisanal mining ; to promote coordination 
among territorial entities through shared and large scale regional projets ; to promote practices 
associated with « good government » ; to promote the inclusion, equity and integral development 
of afro-colombian, rom and indegeneous communities ; to contribute to the social economic and 
environmental restoring in areas were non renewable natural resources have been extracted 
(notwithstanding the responsibilities acquiered by each operator in those areas).   
 In	theory,	through	the	General	Royalties System, all municipalities, districts, and departments 
may co-finance investment proyects which are in line of their respective development plans. 
Projects must be presented following the principles and formats of the logical framework 
approach, also called the “General Adjusted Methodology” in the terms of the National Planning 
Department DNP. Investments may be made in all sectors (transport, water, sport facilities, 
education, risk prevention, science, technology and innovation, among others). If ethnic 
communities are present in a given region, they must have access to a specific amount of the 
investment. Only investment costs are financed (recurrent costs are not considered investments). 
When a co-financement from the General Budget of the Nation is involved, the viability of the 
project needs to be certified by the National Planning Department.  
 
Once a project has answered all criteria established by the Overseeing Board of the General 
Royalties System, it may be presented to one of the five types of Colegial Administration and 
Decision Organs (OCADs), according to the type of project. There are around thousand Municipal 
OCADs (composed of the Mayor, the Governor, a national delegate); about  32 Departemental 
OCADs (composed of the Governor, 10 mayors of the department and 2 ministers); OCADs per 
Regional Development Corporation; about six regional OCADs (composed of governors from the 
region, 2 mayors per department and one mayor per departamental capital, 4 ministers and the 
director of the National Planning Department); one OCAD for cience, technology and innovation 
(composed of 1 governor per region, 6 universities, 3 ministers, the director of DNP and the 
director of Colciencias -the national science board-); and finally the OCAD for the municipalities 
along the Magdalena River and the Canal del Dique (composed of 2 mayors, 2 ministers and the 
Director of DNP). All this to handle only one of the three flows of public resources (the other two 
being the General Budget of the Nation and the General Participations System)…  
 
This is also the intricate channel through which 18,1 billions peso 2016 are expected to be invested 
in the implementation of the peace agreement over the next 10 years. 
 
By Dicember 2016, around 10000 projects had been approved since the creation of the system, for 
a value of 23,5 billion pesos, most of them of a relatively small scope and 65% of them proposed 
by the municipal OCADs  (CGR, 2016). Interdepartmental projects were rather rare and 63% of 
the projects proposed at departmental level involved only one municipality (CGR, 2016). 
Understandably, the CGR insists on the intricated but inefective rules, the complexities and the 
oversized transaction costs involved in the functioning of the system. These explain the level of 
undisbursed SGR amounts : for  the period 2015-2016 alone, undisbursed saldos amounted to 10,7 
billion pesos 2016 (around 4.280 milion euros), of which 6 billion pesos in the SGR account in the 
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Ministry of Finance and 4.7 billion pesos in the accounts of the territorial entities (CGR, 2016)56. 
Additionnally, there were also remanents from earlier years stacked up in the different accounts 
(about 12,7 billion pesos 2016 inherited from the period 2013-2014, CGR, p.5).  
 
As an answer, the Legislative Act Nr 4 dated 8 September 2017 did not seek to fundamentally 
simplify the system and to reincorporate the royalties in the General Budget of the Nation. Instead, 
it suggests that during the next 20 years, those territorial entities that disburse smaller amounts of 
investments (less than 4000 minimum mensual salaries per year), will be provided the authority to 
directly define their investment projects when they are related to the implementation of the Final 
Agreement (without passing through the respective OCADS). All other projects will have to be 
defined by the respective OCADS and could remain trapped in the present rules of the game of the 
General Royalties System. 
 
Summarizing, even in the case if the initial PMI would have been clearly designed, it could not 
have been implemented because of structural obstacles affecting the mobilization of public 
resources in Colombia and because of the fact that actors and their eventual contributions have 
been taken for granted, while they did not have the intention to contribute, or because they were 
not even consulted and in any case had not pledged the allegedly available resources for 
implementation. 
 
Institutional and organizationnel arrangements  
What was the state of the steering capacity of the Colombian State before the signature of the Final 
Agreement? For the executive branch of government, the fabrication of policies seems to matter 
more than their implementation. One of the preferred forms of policy making in Colombia is 
through the planning instances at national, sectorial and territorial levels. At the national level, it 
is barely impossible to present a public policy without obtaining the quality label and a document 
number provided by the so-called CONPES (National Council  for Social and Economic Planning,  
Consejo Nacional de Planificación Económica y Social). But what is in this label? 
 
Initially, when the National Planning Department was created in 1958, through a liminary Law 19 
counting barely 6 clearly written pages, the idea was to create a National Council for Economic 
Policy and Planning that would provide advice to the President and orient the labour of the National 
Planning Department.This Council would be integrated by the President and 4 fulltime high level 
advisers, without any ties to economic activities during their service in the Council. Political parity 
would be preserved. 
 
Over time, this sound initial idea has been strongly altered. The idea of taking care of political 
parity has fully disapeared as well as the idea of professional and independent advisers. At one 
moment, two councils were even created, one for economic and one for social matters…Through 
a Decree dated 8 June 2009, these two Councils were unified and the composition was redefined 
as follows : the Council for Economic and Social Policy and the Council for Social Policy will be 
presided by the President and will be integrated by the Vice-President, 13 Ministers…, the Director 
of the Administrative Departement of the Presidency, the Director of the National Planning 
                                               56	In	2015,	Gustavo	Rogeles	made	an	analysis	of	how	the	banking	system	was	benefitting	from	the	undisbursed	royalty	amounts	:			https://www.las2orillas.co/los-bancos-aprovechan-los-7-billones-de-las-regalias/ 
	 31	
Department and the Director of the Administrative Department for Science, Technology and 
Innovation… 
 
Thus, the Conpes document Number 3687 of 2016, dedicated to “The strategy for organizational  
preparation for Peace and post conflict” was prepared by a CONPES composed as follows : “Juan 
Manuel Santos Calderón, Presidente de la República; Germán Vargas Lleras, Vicepresidente de la 
República; Juan Fernando Cristo Bustos, Ministro del Interior; María Ángela Holguín Cuéllar, 
Ministra de Relaciones Exteriores ; Mauricio Cárdenas Santamaría, Ministro de Hacienda y 
Crédito Público; Jorge Eduardo Londoño Ulloa, Ministro de Justicia y del Derecho; Luis Carlos 
Villegas Echeverri, Ministro de Defensa Nacional; Aurelio Iragorri Valencia, Ministro de 
Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural; Alejandro Gaviria Uribe, Ministro de Salud y Protección Social; 
Clara López Obregón,  Ministra de Trabajo; Germán Arce Zapata, Ministro de Minas y Energía;  
Maria Claudia Lacouture Pinedo, Ministra de Comercio, Industria y Turismo;  Gina Parody 
d'Echeona, Ministra de Educación Nacional; Luis Gilberto Murillo Urrutia, Ministro de Ambiente 
y Desarrollo Sostenible;  Elsa Noguera De la Espriella, Ministra de Vivienda, Ciudad y Territorio; 
David Luna Sánchez, Ministro de Tecnologías de la Información y las Comunicaciones; Jorge 
Eduardo Rojas Giraldo, Ministro de Transporte;  Mariana Garcés Córdoba, Ministra de Cultura;  
Yaneth Giha Tovar, Directora Colciencias and Tatyana Orozco de la Cruz, Directora Prosperidad 
Social”.  
 
What this means is that the modality of CONPES, initially devised to function as a situation room 
for essential strategic economic and social decisions, has become a mere replica of an already 
copious council of ministers. The difference between the CONPES and the council of ministers 
has become blurred for many, leading to surprising situations. Sometimes the Ministers, as 
members of the Conpes, make recommandations to “the Conpes” and even to themselves : “the 
members of the CONPES, recommend to the CONPES (sic), soliciting from the national 
government entities, the DNP, the Ministry fo Finance etc.” (CONPES 3850, p.52). These 
ministerial / CONPES meetings have also had the tendency to produce too many documents each 
year, further contributing to the erosion of their steering value. Today, having a document stamped 
and numbered “by the CONPES” remains obliged, but as a mere bureaucratic requierement, and 
in no way as a guaranty for its quality and neither for it´s future implementation. Two CONPES 
documents 3859 of 2016 and 3951 of 2018 dedicated to the creation and the financing of a 
multipurpose kadaster are thus still awaiting implementation57.. 
 
                                               57	The	comment	from	Mathilde	Molendijk		(Nederlands	Kadaster),	might	then	be	contextualized	«	No	hay	que	ir	muy	lejos	para	entender	los	problemas	de	ejecución,	tienen	que	ver	con	el	aparataje	estatal	colombiano,	plagado	de	burocracia	y	tramitomanía:	«Por	ahora	la	dificultad	que	identificamos	en	la	parte	 jurídica,	 los	procedimientos	en	Colombia	son	 lentos	y	complejos.	El	desafío	es	hacer	que	 la	recolección	de	 información	y	 formularios	 sea	más	eficiente	 sin	 sacrificar	 la	 seguridad	 jurídica.	El	gobierno	pide	muchas	veces	la	misma	información	y	eso	solo	crea	un	volumen	de	datos	que	hacen	más	difícil	procesarlos.	Creo	que	el	80%	de	los	formularios	y	procedimientos	son	innecesarios	para	obtener	 seguridad	 jurídica.	 Es	 una	 preocupación	 que	 compartimos	 todas	 las	 instituciones	 del	proyecto»,	inisiste	 Mathilde	 Molendijk,	 gerente	 de	 Kadaster	 Internacional.	»	 (Semana	 rural,	“Titulación	exprés,	la	técnica	holandesa	para	mapear	la	tierra	‘de	nadie’	en	Colombia.”	Semana	rural.	Accessed	 January	 18,	 2019.	 https://semanarural.com/articulo/titulacion-expres-la-tecnica-holandesa-para-mapear-la-tierra-de-nadie-en-colombia/693.) 
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The CONPES documents then tend to join the impressive bulk of all kinds of other policy, planning 
and programming documents yearly produced in Colombia. The list is integrated by  the National 
Development Plan (the main document); the Bases for the National Development Plan  (the 
Annex), the Medium Term Framework for Disbursment, the Contracts with the Regions; the 
Contracts for Peace;  the Departmental Spatial Ordering Plans; the Territorial Spatial Ordering 
Plans; the Basic Territorial Ordering Plans; the River Bassin Spatial Ordering and Management 
Plans; the Management Plans and Specific Management Regimes for National Parks; a Rice Plan; 
the Structuration of Integral Plans for Rural and Agricultural Development; Plans for Sustainanble 
Access to Energy (PERS), and many others. Some of these plans are specifically called action 
plans, probably, to be sure, or as opposed to others that do not have that intention.  
 
The overall governemental approach to public steering and planning remains desesperately 
conventional. Steering methodologies that did not work at national level, ought not be transferred 
at territorial levels, but they still are.  Rather than reinforcing public steering capacities, the used 
planning and programming methodologies generate markets for multiple intermediaries, in 
prefeasibility studies, in the preparation of the planning processes, during the planning process, or 
in order to monitor them. The focus is often on the filling of predesigned formats, the writing of 
documents, without taking into account uncertainty58 and potential conflicts generated by the 
diverse actions. Many plans do not count with a minimum reflection on the order in which 
activities should be implemented, by which coalitions of actors and financed by whom (Matus, 
1987). Financial contributions from third party actors are assumed, but without informing them, 
without negotiation and agreement and without awaiting formal pledges (CGR, 2018). At all 
levels, despite the participatory rethoric, this practice of planning turns steering into a harmless 
bureautic exercice. Too often the question of the resource base for all these plans (capacities, 
political will, authority,  power, space, time, knowledge, financial resources, other resources) is 
basically left aside. Notwithstanding this, elaborate action and monitoring plans (PAS) are set up, 
sometimes including the emails and phone numbers of the although often changing functionaries… 
Likewise, multiples monitoring information systems are set up (SINERGIA, SIAC, SMByC, 
SMRV, SPI, and even the Sistema Integrado de Información para el Posconflicto (SIIPO) etc.) but 
one wonders who interprets and receives the signals and who transforms them in corrective 
measures. 
 
The results are seen on the ground : the civil presence of the State has been rare, specifically in the 
urban and rural margins. Economic performances do adequately reflect the level of unmobilized 
and uncoordinated capacities. The civil steering capacity of the State was low before the signature 
of the Final Agreement. This got worse after the signature.  
 
In it self,  the Final Agreement constitutes another public policy, with the weaknesses analyzed in 
the previous sections.  Whatever the lower quality of the formulation of certain chapters, the Final 
Agreement adds to the stapple of existing plans and also generates a new flow of planning exercises 
and documents : the Comprehensive Plan for the Implementation of the Final Agreement (PMI); 
the Development Programmes with a Territorial Approache (PDET);  the Action Plans for 
Territorial Transformation (PATR); the National Comprehensive Rural Reform Plans; The 
Comprehensive Programme for the Substitution of Crops used for Illicit Purposes (PNIS); the 
                                               58	National	and	territorial	authorities	were	barely	equipped	to	deal	with	the	fluctuations	of	the	oil	prices 
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Comprehensive community and municipal substitution and alternative development plans 
(PISDA); the Plan for Immediate Attention to the Development of Productive Projects; Plans for 
zones that are sparcely populated and that are situated far away;  the National Comprehensive 
Programme for the Substitution of Crops destinated to Illicit uses in National Parks; Participatory 
action plans with a territorial and population approach against the consumption of illicit drugs; the 
Environmental Zoning Plan; the National Plan for Feeder Roads; the National Plan for Irrigation 
and Draining for the Peasant Economy; the National Rural Electrification Plan; the National Rural 
Connectivity Plan; The Special Rural Education Plan; the Land repartition plan for women that 
are head of their families; the National plan for the construction and improvement of  rural social 
housing; the national plan for the development of the social and cohesioned economy; the National 
plan for the comprehensive technical and technological assistance and the impuls for research; the 
plan for support and consolidation of the incomes of the peasant, family and community based 
economy, and the middle sized producers and producers with less incomes; the national plan for 
the promotion of the marketing of the production of  the peasant, family and community based 
economy; a Progressive Plan for social protection and the defence of the rights of rural workers 
(women and men); Departmental plans for culturally appropriate food and nutrition; Plan for the 
massive formalization of rural property; Social Ordening plans of rural property POSPR;  etc.  
 
All these plans (the old, the new) imply multiple overlapping arenas of all types, (national nutrition 
council, municipal council for the integration of participatory plans, municipal councils for 
monitoring and evaluation, departamental transactional justice councils, the 5 OCADs of the 
royalties system, etc.)  : the scarce leadership capacities at the local level are overwhelmend and 
the transaction costs for the implementation of often tiny investments and measures are huge. Most 
of these additional councils are ignoring the democratic instances foreseen in the Constitution 
(municipal and departmental councils). A simple continuation of present public management and 
steering approaches will further weaken the prospect for effective future public policy 
implementation, whatever the direction of that policy. An overhaul is needed. Such an overhaul is 
partially considered in the National Development Plan 2018-2022 presently discussed in Congress.  
 
Much has been already written regarding the new National Development Plan (the law 
encapsulating  the main document contains articles that do have nothing to do with the nature of 
the planning process, the Final Agreement is barely mentioned, the needed investments for the 
implementation of the Final Agreement are not specified, no financing is foreseen for the PDETs 
from the General Budget of the Nation, the wishes in the PATR are not respected ; etc.,), which 
allows us to concentrate on the following issues. 
 
While the authors agree with the CGR report regarding the need to invest in the capacity to create 
synergies, the authors of this text do not share the regional planning approach defended all over 
the National Development Plan. The main idea behind the approach is that public resources should 
not be “scatered all over the territory”, including in far, low-populated and not connected areas. 
Instead, the PND suggests to concentrate resources there where major productivity gains can be 
obtained (there where there are already linkages, connections, energy and informations flows etc.). 
This argument seems to have travelled and is threaded through various documents… Based on a 
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position paper prepared by RIMISP, this idea is also defended in the CGR report of 201859, and 
paradoxically also subjacent in paragraphs of the Final Agreement 60 and even in Law 90661...  
 
In our view, this approach represents the return to a conventional trickle down approach which 
was common in the regional planning in the eighties, an aproach that has precisely produced the 
inequities and social despair at the root of civil war. By contrast, the authors are in favor of 
inclusive territorial approaches, like those preconized by the IDB in the Pacific Region of 
Colombia, the PNR in the conflict zones and the Integral Rural Development Fund (DRI). These 
are based on investing in the consolidation of public and private solidarities and the improvement 
of linkages were they do not yet exist (van Vliet, Caron, Moyano, 2003). 
2.3.2 International community : far from the Paris agreements on the effectiveness 
of aid 
The yearly contribution of the international community is insignificant when compared to the 
amount of unspent public resources in the royalties system. If not for its quantity, the real value of 
the contribution of the international cooperation is twofold. On the one hand it provided external 
political legitimacy for a peace process that lacked internal social and political backing. The other 
side was merely practical : while government coordinated its cumbersome planning and 
administrative processes, the main investments really made on the ground (and explicitly referred 
to as contributions to peace) have been taken care of by the international community (UNDP, 
USAID, EU Fiduciary Trust Fund for Peace in Colombia, GIZ, Norway, smaller NGO´s, etc.). 
This was the result of an explicit policy of the Presidential Agency for Colombia´s International 
Cooperation (APC). 
 
The first aim of the APC was indeed to move away international cooperation projects from their 
confort zones in relatively quiet and central geographical areas of Colombia and attract them to 
the conflict areas and the margins. The directive of government contained a clear geographical 
focus of interventions : areas with armed conflict, illicit drugs, low access to justice, disperse rural 
                                               
59 “En	este	contexto,	convendría	agilizar	la	intervención	en	algunos	municipios	de	las	subregiones	PDET	que	están	más	cerca	de	contar	con	las	condiciones	y	capacidades	suficientes	para	contribuir	efectivamente	a	la	transformación	territorial.”	CGR,	p.	50	(citando	informe	preparado	por	RIMISP).	 
60 “Plans	 for	 remote	 areas	 and	 areas	with	 low	 population	 density.	 In	 areas	with	 low	 population	density	and	areas	which	are	difficult	to	access	owing	to	location	and	distance,	making	it	difficult	to	supply	 goods	 and	 services	 to	 ensure	 the	 well-being	 and	 quality	 of	 life	 for	 the	 people	 and	 the	territorial-based	integration	thereof,	special	measures	will	be	developed	for	the	substitution	of	crops	used	for	illicit	purposes,	recovery	of	ecosystems,	creation	of	new	employment	opportunities	related	to	river	transport,	environmental	regeneration	programmes,	protection	of	forests	and	wildlife,	etc.,	without	prejudice	 to	alternatives	 for	 relocation	of	communities	settled	 there,	where	possible	and	necessary,	 in	 consultation	with	communities,	 to	 improve	 their	 living	conditions.	Final	agreement,	2016,	Section	4.1.3.6.	e.,	p.122”. 61	“Este	tipo	de	adjudicación	sólo	podrá	hacerse	en	zonas	focalizadas	donde	exista	una	intervención	articulada	 del	 Estado	 que	 garantice	 que	 la	 actividad	 productive	 sea	 sostenible	 en	 el	 tiempo”,	Presidencia	de	la	República,	decreto	902,	Art	25. 
 
	 35	
ares, low fiscal capacity etc. etc. (CONPES 3850, p. 41). The APC and DNP globally succeded 
with respect to this aim.  
 
The second objective of the APC and DNP (CONPES 3850) was to coordinate and steer peace 
building efforts by the international community through the creation of a basket fund, the 
Colombian Peace Fund (FCP)62, the dream being that under the umbrella of the ACP and the 
National Planning Department, the FCP would be “the fund of funds”, the “holding account” (sic) 
for all donors and the coordination body of all international cooperation for peace  (CONPES 3850, 
p. 34-37). This did not happen. As soon as the fund was created, the leadership role of DNP and 
the ACP was questioned by two other infighting peace instances : the High Commissioner for 
Peace and the High Counselor for Post-conflict. Sectoral ministers were also worrying about their 
control of the peace related investment flows. Despite the fullfledged CONPES (the abundant 
council of ministers presided by the President) and its documents, and despite the creation of a 
parallel “post-conflict gabinet” (CGR, 2018, p. 111), the Colombian government was not prepared 
for the implementation of the peace agreement.  
 
Instead of one overarching fund coordinating all others, what occurred was that the international 
community fostered the creation of four other independent basket funds : the Peace Fund managed 
by the UNDP, the Fund for peace and post-conflict managed by the World Bank with fincancial 
contribution form Sweden, the Fund Sustainable Colombia managed by the IDB,  and the 
European Union Trust Fund for Peace in Colombia (EUTF). As the capacity of the Colombian 
State to provide adequate and timely co-financing was so worrysome (refer to the multiple 
problems carecterizing public management in the General Royalty System, the General Budget of 
the Nation and the General Participations System), government did not dispose of any financial 
leverage in the decisions, even when government was diplomatically invited to participate in the 
steering councils of these funds. The role of national, department and municipal governements was 
therefor low (Bases para el Plan de Desarrollo, 2018, 646-648). The tendency for donors has been 
to shy away from government (and its red tape) and to invent implementation schemes, that were 
in practice directly managed by the donors, and following their own rules. Each fund generated its 
own organisation, with its staff and its procedures (Bases para el plan de desarrollo, 2018, p. 648-
649).  Some of the funds were a replica of a general scheme of trust funds that had already been 
implemented elsewhere, like the one created by the United Nations or the one managed by the 
European Union.  
 
European Union Fiduciary Trust Funds were the object of close scrutiny from European parliament 
(Carrera   et al. 2018), the European Court of Auditors (ECA, 2017), and an European think tank 
(Hauck et al., 2015). The main critical points identified in the thus available literature are : the idea 
of EUTF was seen as a means to intervene in situations where the recipient State was unable to 
provide public services and goods (in short, in the case of failed States) : nevertheless an EUTF 
was set up in Colombia…; the creation of EUTFs was based on the assumption that they could 
operate more swiftly than the conventional technical and financial assistance programmes of the 
                                               62	The	creation	of	the	FCP	ignored	the	already	existing	organisations	:	two	funds	with	similar	aims,	equiped	with	procedures	and	experienced	staff	already	existed	before	the	creation	of	the	FCP	:	the	Fund	for	Special	Programs	for	Peace	(FONDOPAZ)	and	the	Peace	Investment	Fund	(FIP)	(CGR,	2018,	p.	110).	
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EU : this was not verified in most of the EUTFs; the lack of parlementarian control on EUTFs, due 
to the fact that each trust fund is created as an autonomous body, with its own steering mechanisms, 
procedures and staff, even when EU funds are providing the bulk of the financial resources; the 
tendency to irrespect the Paris agreements on the effectiveness of foreign aid63, through sidelining 
national government and their policies in the decision and implementation processes; the return to 
tied foreign assistance : all actions are implemented by firms and NGO´s coming from the 
members of the EUTFs or by entities belonging to the United Nations system, like the FAO,  with 
no or little role for public and private entities from the recipient country; etc.); most actions on the 
field are implemented with the logos of the donors, without acknowledging governmental 
authorities at the several levels, etc. Several of these situations may also be found in Colombia. 
However, contrary to what had generally ocurred with EUTF´s elsewhere, the coordination 
between the Presidential counselors for post-conflict and the management team of the EUTF in 
Colombia allowed the participation of these instances in strategic and operational decisions. 
 
The international “community” did not really function as a community. Coordination among funds 
was scarce. The first reports (20 July 2018, 28 september 2018) of the United Nations Verification 
Mission in Colombia do refer only to actions implemented by Government or by the own entities 
of the United Nations. The report of 28 december 2018 finally mentions the existence of the EU 
Trust Fund for peace, while it was created two years earlier, on 12 dicember 2016… Meanwhile 
the contribution of USAID, it´s Strategy towards Peace and its projects on the ground were not 
taken into account.  
 
Summarizing, the Colombian government expressed a desire to coordinate the operations of the 
international community but did not prepare for it, and the international community, because of a 
certain level of fear of the red tape and the politization of decisions in the public sector, did not 
express a clear desire to be coordinated by the Colombian government, despite the existence of 
open interpersonal communication channels. As a result, disperse activites may be seen at field 
level : although these are highly appreciated by the local stakeholders involved (it is often the only  
sign that something is changing thanks to the final agreement), the State cannot delegate the 
implementation of the rural dimension of the final agreement to international cooperation.  
Conclusions and recommendations 
 
1. The need to update the Framework Plan for Implementation (PMI) : strategic 
implications 
The discursive and often unprecise nature of those sections of the final agreement that are dealing 
with the rural dimension, explain the confusions and delivery problems on the ground in the two 
departments. 
 
The rural dimension of the Final Agreement is too vaguely formulated. The first commonly 
                                               63	https://www.oecd.org/fr/cad/efficacite/34579826.pdf	
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approved PMI did not improve on this. The discursive character of the formulation of the rural 
dimension in the final agreement and in the initial PMI do not create precise obligations for 
government. In fact, contrary to what is argued64, the vagueness is such that there is no need for 
the present government to undo or tear to pieces what has been agreed on this matter in the final 
agreement. Because of the insufficient preciseness in the two texts, a strategy consisting of simply 
insisting with government on the strict implementation of all the elements of the rural dimension 
in the Final Agreement and the PMI might not be effective, the more because the problems 
identified above would have to be faced, whatever the color of the presidency. 
 
The absence of a precise, operationalized, viable and shared PMI eases the way for a scenario in 
which this new government might go forward with only a few of the measures and investments 
evoked in the final agreement. That is, it might implement some measures from the Final 
Agreement that are already contained in the report of the Misión for the Transformation of Rural 
Colombia (DNP, 2016),  but only those that are closest to the interests of the coalition which 
supports this presidency. All others measures and  investments foreseen in the final agreement 
would then be put on slow motion (Segura and Stein, 2018, p.22). This scenario has already been 
partially materializing in the document “Bases for the National Development Plan” (the annex of 
the National Development Plan) (DNP, 2018) and might be even sharpened in the main text of the 
“National Development Plan 2018-2022” (DNP, 2019)65, both texts proposed for approval of 
congress in February 2019. 
 
This being said, the authors argue that the proposed National Development Plan 2018-2022 
contains valuable ideas which, if explored, developed and implemented, would also benefit the 
deployment of the measures and investments considered for the rural dimension of the Final 
Agreement.   
 
In view of our argument, we will select only a few of these stimulating proposals. The first is to 
give a clear role to the private sector seen as a continuum of micro, small, medium and large 
enterprises between which linkages have to be fostered. The second valuable idea is to provide a 
priority role to departments, districts, municipalities and indigenous territories for all decisions 
and investments that relate to public goods and services, according to the principles of 
coordination, working together and subsidiarity established in the Constitution. The third sound 
idea is to actively foster free associations between territorial entities : this was already foreseen in 
                                               
         64 “Duque	 no	 hizo	 trizas	 el	 Acuerdo	 en	 2018	 pero	 tampoco	 le	 dio	 protagonismo.”	 La	 Silla	 Vacía.	Accessed	 January	 14,	 2019.	 https://lasillavacia.com/duque-no-hizo-trizas-el-acuerdo-en-2018-pero-tampoco-le-dio-protagonismo-69526.	“¿Se	puede	hacer	trizas	la	Reforma	Rural?”	La	Silla	Vacía.	Accessed	 April	 30,	 2018.	 http://lasillavacia.com/silla-llena/red-rural/historia/se-puede-hacer-trizas-la-reforma-rural-65811.	 “¿Echarle	 tierra	 a	 la	 reforma	 rural	 integral?	 |	 Colombia	 2020.”	Accessed	 December	 14,	 2018.	 https://colombia2020.elespectador.com/justicia/echarle-tierra-la-reforma-rural-integral. 
 
65  Desfinanciación	de	la	paz,	visión	militarista	y	menos	reparación	en	el	Plan	Nacional	de	Desarrollo,	El	 Espectador,	 11	 Febrero	 2019,		(https://colombia2020.elespectador.com/politica/desfinanciacion-de-la-paz-vision-militarista-y-menos-reparacion-en-el-plan-nacional-de) 
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the Constitution (Art 286) but  has not seen massive implementation and legal recognition. 
Convening territorial entities towards free associations, could ease the implementation of regional 
or micro-regional approaches that are today hampered by the political-administrative 
fragmentation. It could thus lead to larger territorial entities (including Administrative Planning 
Regions - Regiones Administrativas de Planificación-RAP, which could constitute the adequate 
frame for the implementation of larger regional investments and measures, thus retaking some of 
the functions held by the CORPES in the past). The fourth fundamental idea is to simplify the 
functioning of the State and the way it is financed and organized. The fifth idea is to revise the 
way in which National Government may stimulate departments, districts, municipalities and 
indigeneous territories towards larger policy goals agreed in the National development Plan, 
without jeopardizing their relative autonomy. The sixth idea is to resolve the fragmentation of the 
implementation of foreseen actions regarding the rural dimension of the final agreement66.  
 
In view of the relative forces in parliament, the challenge would be to obtain the inclusion in the 
new National Development Plan of at least several clearcut and essential elements of the final 
agreement (and that are not taken into account in the report of the “Misión  para la transformación 
del Campo”, DNP, 2016, like land restition to victims, land regularization for small holders and 
voluntary substitution, …), while insuring that all the recommendations of the “Misión para la 
transformación del Campo” are duly taken into account. 
 
                                               66 	In	 terms	 of	 reducing	 fragmentation,	 Decree	 719	 of	 2019	 restructures	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	Presidency	of	the	Republic,	appoints	16	presidential	advisers	and	eliminates	several		high	councils.	The	staff		of	the	High	Commissioner	for	Stabilization	and	Consolidation	(formerly	High	Commissioner	for	Postconflict)	was	reduced.	Instead,	the	staff	of	the	High	Commissioner	for	Peace	OACP	has	been	increased.	Its	role	will	probably	shift	from	dialogues	with	armed	actors	(under	Uribe	the	notion	of	internal	conflict	was	in	fact	never	acknowledged)	to	to	the	promotion	of	dialogues	in	regions	were	extractive	activities	have	generated	tensions	with	local	populations.  
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Such an approach will not avoid a rigorous and necessary reworking on the initial PMI, as foreseen 
in the Final Agreement. In order to make this possible, the Decree renewing the functioning of the 
CSIVI should be signed by government67. Taking into account the recommendations made in CGR 
(2018), the CSIVI should then invest time and resources to rework the PMI and produce a PMI2, 
which would maintain a ten year perspective, but would be focused on the present presidential 
period 2019-2022. This would imply developing an agreed implementation strategy (what is 
essential, what less?; what should be worked on first, what needs to be done once the foundations 
have been built, what will generate too much opposition, what should be done first in order to 
generate political capital for complexer measures later?). On this base, identify and list the universe 
of the tasks ahead. 
 
Then, guided by the principle of subsidiarity, firstly separate what does not need to be implemented 
by the State, but can be done by the organized private sector (private sector as the broad 
                                               
67 The	CSIVI	 is	now	composed	of	the	Minister	of	 Interior,	 the	High	Peace	Commissioner,	 the	High	Presidential	 Counceller	 for	 Post-conflict	 and	 Jairo	 Estrada,	 Rodrigo	 Granda	 and	 Ronald	 Rojas	 in	representation	 of	 the	 FARC	 party.	 http://www.posconflicto.gov.co/sala-prensa/noticias/2019/Paginas/Alto-Consejero-Archila-responde-al-pedido-de%C2%A0Rodrigo-Londono-de-reunirse-30-minutos-con-el-gobierno.aspx,	 accessed	 10	february	2019.	 	As	of	10	March	2019,	there	has	been	no	meeting	of	the	CSIVI	since	the	change	of	government.	The	Decree	that	should	renew	its	functionning	has	not	yet	been	signed.  
FT
Ru
ra
l d
im
en
sio
n,
 
Fi
na
l A
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
20
16
generalizadoI
The rural 
dimension in the 
National 
Development 
Plan 2018-2022
The rural dimension in Colombian public policies 2018-2022?
M
isi
ón
Pa
ra
 la
 
Tr
an
sfo
rm
ac
ió
n
de
l C
am
po
 
Co
lo
m
bi
an
o,
 D
NP
 2
01
6
Van Vliet, Ramírez, 2019, based on Segura and Stein, 2018 y “Desfinanciación de 
la paz”, el Espectador, 11-2-2019
Peasant 
Peserve
Zones
Cadastre
Access to 
land
Functional 
territories
Value chains
Repartition
Legalisation
and 
subsidies
?
Nation wide 
applied, law
Applied 
whenever 
possible
Inclusiveness? Competitiveness?
Restitution
Sustainable 
Territories
PDET
Voluntary substitution 
first option? Forced 
substitution?Volontary
substitution, 
first option
ZEII
	 40	
continuum defined in the final agreement p. 12 : “family farming (family run and community based 
economy), agroindustry, tourism, agriculture on a commercial scale”. Design a simple fund 
transfer mechanism for the projects implemented under the umbrella of the organized private 
sector (including the family run and community based private sector members) with clear, 
transparent rules of the game (some of the sectorial policies referred to in the final agreement could 
be transformed in rules of the game for the various components that might be financed under this 
broad private sector mobilization strategy). These rules of the game could foster cooperation, 
equity, social justice, cofinancing by those who have more financial leeway, perequation between 
regions and actors along the value-chains and many of the principles evoqued in the final 
agreement, as long as they can be transformed in clearcut, easily agreeable and verifiable 
indicators. 
 
Secondly, list the remaining tasks that should be implemented by the public sector. Again, 
inspired by the principle of subsidiarity, specify the tasks at various levels, starting with the 
municipalities, districts and indigenous territories (associated or not), then the departments 
(associated or not) and finally the national government. Likewise devise a simple way of 
transferring resources from the national government to departments, municipalities districts and 
indigenous territories. The first option could be to trust territorial entities by straightforwardly 
incrementing the already existing flow of national resources via the Sistema General de 
Participaciones, and by simply enlarging the list of authorized expenses (for example, those related 
to the implementation of the rural dimension of the Final Agreement in the territorial development 
plans). A second option could be to strengthen the funding capacities of the Agency for Territorial 
Renovation, as long as the ART can demonstrate, and this is recognized by relevant 
stakeholders in the regions, that the ART adds value to decisions otherwise taken by the 
territorial entities. If this is not the case, reinforce the direct transfers to territorial authorities, 
associated or not, which will then play a clear role for the provision of public goods and services 
in the PDET areas (in that case, reinforce the flow of resources of the General Participation System 
and widen the list of authorized spendings). 
 
2. A Colombian State caught in its own nets :  options for untangling 
 
The Colombian State was already caught up in its own financial, administrative, organizational 
and planning nets (van Vliet, 1992) far before the agreement. This did not improve there after.  
 
Public finances. The financial foundation of the PMI elaborated in 2018 is in no way credible, not 
because the Colombian state is bankrupt – there are instead billions of pesos of unspent resources 
within the General Royalty System-, but because mention is made of : i) resources that are already 
difficult to manage without final agreement (the resources of the General Budget of the Nation, its 
ley de Garantías, the overburdening controls that unsoundly send hundreds of mayors, rectors, 
directors to the tribunals); and ii) resources that are not under control of the national government 
and that could indeed be mobilized but under condition of previous agreements and voluntary 
pledgings (the resources from the General Participations System, the own resources of territorial 
authorities, the resources from the international cooperation, the private sector) and iii) resources 
from the General Royalties System, which needs an overhaul. 
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The General Royalties sytsem represent a potential source of financing of the Final Agreement, 
but only if it is profoundly reformed. Serious doubts remain on how the resources channeled under 
the present rules of the game and the multiple decision arenas will finance activites foreseen in the 
Final Agreement, and more generally, any other activity, what ever the intention is.  The measures 
taken in the Legislative Act 4 dated 8 september 2017 are not resolving the core of the issue. The 
bare fact is that other than the history of royalties management in Colombia (the legacy of the 
Fondo de Regalías), there is no reason whatsoever to continue treating royalties as distinct and 
separately from taxes or other forms of public revenue. If the resources generated by royalties 
remain managed as distinct from the General Budget of the Nation, risks are that the pipeline of 
royalties will continue to be perforated to answer any urgent social demand (grants for students, 
terciary roads, etc) without due scrutiny by congress or civil society. The General Royalty System 
should therefor be steadily  incorporated in the General Budget of the Nation.  In turn, the rules 
managing the General Budget of the Nation could benefit from some of the very interesting rules 
contained in art. 360 and 361 of the Constitution and Law  1530 (the idea of an agreed transparent 
repartition key and the participation of civil society in view of reinforcing the monitoring by 
congress of the policy process).   
 
The territorial governments from areas where natural resources are exploited or transported 
(fluvially or maritimely), will be probably opposed to see what they consider “their” rents, 
“escaping to any region and anyone”. This fear is legitime but might be taken care of as follows. 
The idea of transparent  and previously agreed repartition keys referred to in Art 360 and 361 of 
the Constitution should be applied to the General Budget of the Nation (once it incorporates the 
resources previously managed under the General Royalty System). A clear and agreed repartition 
key in the General Participation System would also be useful, as long as the use of these repartition 
keys remains understandable and monitoreable by the citizens involved. 
 
The persisting tradition for DNP and the Ministry of Finances, to privilege investments 
(infrastructures) and forget the recurrent (operational) costs was already questioned long ago (i.a. 
van Vliet, 1992): but the results of this unfounded public policy principle are still observed today, 
with schools without teachers and hospitals without doctors and nurses : territorial authorities are 
not the only ones to be blamed for these situations. Within a performance based approach of the 
financing of the public sector, public finances should be organized in a way such that the integrality 
of an investment is taken care of, in order to generate the expected results. 
 
Public policies. Plans remain a necessary tool to govern and to act. However, the tendency to 
formulate plans at any level and for any sector (including plans for action, as if other plans did not 
have this intention…), has generated such a flow of policy documents that the sense of planning 
as a means to precede and guide action is getting lost. This was true before the signature of the 
agreement, but is even more true thereafter. The conventional planning approach of the PDET is 
ineffective and contributes to despair and loss of political capital. Other planning approaches exist 
and may be mobilized. The term “plan” should be sparcily used, and less time invested in designing 
plans would liberate resources for their implementation. A return to the initial idea of CONPES 
(an independent professionalized thinktank, respecting the variety of political postions, treating 
only a few subjects each year) would be useful. The present proliferation of monitoring and 
	 42	
evaluation systems of public investments should be contained and reversed. This profound reform 
of the functioning of the Colombian State should not be trusted to CONPES… 
 
3. International cooperation : the need to bring Paris to the La Havana agreement 
Agencies providing international accompaniment  regarding the rural dimension of the agreement, 
ensured the bulk of implementation in the peripheric and most conflictive arease; however their 
way of operating is not easying a coordinated contribution of the Colombian State and the 
organized private sector to the implementation of the agreement. International cooperation should 
respect the principles of the Paris declaration on the effectiveness of international aid : the 
intervention schemes should take into account the situation of the Colombian State. The 
Colombian State is not failed, just stumbling under its own red tape : high level technical and 
coordinated assistance could provide policy guidance towards a sound simplification of the 
Colombian financial, institutional and organizational stances, instead of creating trust funds that 
sideline the private sector and the State at the national and territorial levels. 
4. The need to resituate the land question in a broader discussion on employment 
and sustainable value chains  
Land was central in the agreement, but, probably because of the accepted initial frame for 
negotiation with its respective redlines, the options finally provided are not answering the 
problems of land concentration and land speculation. Land policy measures suppose that the 
State has the monopoly regarding the use of force and that it uses this monopoly wisely. These 
conditions are only partially filled today, impeding i.a. the implementation of the multi-purpose 
cadaster in Caqueta and Putumayo. Within the narrow margins of action left during this 
presidency, the priority in Caquetá and Putumayo should be given to land regularization for small 
holdings, consolidating the ZRCs and experimenting with the approach of  “rights of use”.  
Given the present political constraints, the land equation needs probably to be reframed in a wider 
regional discussion on revenue generation and alternative sources of employment. Creating 
productive employment alternatives represents a challenge that has not been adequately anticipated 
and valued in the final agreement. Former combattants, unauthorized dwellers that will be 
relocated from the protected areas, peasants that will be relocated from the frontier to the 
consolidated areas, because they are situated to far from the possibility of accessing public services 
(thanks to the announced functional territory approach), or coca workers returning from the closing 
ilicit drug value chains, will all need income and employment alternatives. Part of these new jobs 
will have to be created in the largest employment bassins around Bogotá, Cali, Medellín and 
Barranquilla. But part needs to be absorbed in the secondary cities, including those in Caqueta and 
Putumayo. For the departemental and municipal governments in the two departements, the first 
priority will be to systematically increase the number of sustainable jobs in and around the 
departmental capitals and main agglomerations (agricultural products, products from the 
extractives industries, their transformation, supporting infrastructures and services) taking into 
account that most areas are environmentally and culturally sensible and that commonly agreed 
rules of the game have to be crafted. This will be a daunting task and will ask for new approaches, 
where the inventivity of research centers and the private sector, including the micro, medium and 
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enterprises from the solidar economy, will be asked to play a key role. This involves moving the 
narrow discussions on land to the wider frame of sustainable value-chains (industrial and agro-
industrial; short, medium and long), in which a variety of productive assets (including land but not 
only) and multiple social linkages will play a role. 
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